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Abstract In the flowering of Red-Green Thought over the past two decades, metabolic
rift thinking is surely one of its most colorful varieties. The metabolic rift has captured
the imagination of critical environmental scholars, becoming a shorthand for capital-
ism’s troubled relations in the web of life. This article pursues an entwined critique and
reconstruction: of metabolic rift thinking and the possibilities for a post-Cartesian
perspective on historical change, the world-ecology conversation. Far from dismissing
metabolic rift thinking, my intention is to affirm its dialectical core. At stake is not
merely the mode of explanation within environmental sociology. The impasse of
metabolic rift thinking is suggestive of wider problems across the environmental social
sciences, now confronted by a double challenge. One of course is the widespread—and
reasonable—sense of urgency to evolve modes of thought appropriate to an era of
deepening biospheric instability. The second is the widely recognized—but inadequate-
ly internalized—understanding that humans are part of nature.
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Dialectics does not consider fixed artifacts, formations and objects, the entire
complex of both the material world of things and that of ideas…, to be something
original and autonomous. It does not accept them in their ready-made form, but
subjects them to investigation in which the reified forms of the objective and the
ideal worlds dissolve, [and] lose their fixed and natural character.
– Karel Kosík (1976, p. 6)
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To assume one basis for [human] life and a different basis for science is, as a
matter of course, a lie.
– Karl Marx (1959, p. 98)
In the flowering of Red-Green Thought over the past two decades, metabolic rift
thinking is surely one of its most colorful varieties.1 The metabolic rift has captured
the imagination of critical environmental scholars, becoming shorthand for capital-
ism’s troubled relations in the web of life. This rift is generally understood in two
overlapping senses. One is rift as separation. In this capitalism “continuously…
separate[s] the social metabolism from the natural metabolism” (Clark and York
2005, p. 417). The second is rift as agent of disruption. Capitalism’s “global metabolic
rift” has “disrupted the ‘eternal natural condition’ of life itself” (Foster 2015 quoting
Marx 1977, p. 637).
Rift thinking is frequently called a theory (Foster 1999, 2013; Moore 2011a, b). But
the perspective offers few explicit theorizations of the capitalism/nature relation. Rift
arguments form, rather, a family of conceptualizations that pivot on environmentalist
tropes of separation and disruption. These have been productive. They have allowed for
insightful investigations into capitalism as a way of organizing nature. That Rift
analyses have rarely theorized capitalism’s socio-ecological contradictions—beyond
marxisante axioms that (rightly) say capitalism does terrible things to nature—accounts
for a meaningful share of its flexibility and popularity. Metabolism has become a plastic
category that can be molded to serve diverse analytical objectives. The Rift perspec-
tive’s great accomplishment has been to join together—without synthesizing—the
Green emphasis on modernity’s environmental consequences and the Red focus on
capitalism’s political economy. As such, the metabolic rift represents the highest stage
of “Green Arithmetic”: Society plus Nature equals Crisis.
This is no small accomplishment. Led by John Bellamy Foster’s lively pen and
accessible prose, the Rift became a breakout hit in the decade after Marx’s Ecology
appeared (Foster 2000a). Foster and his colleagues popularized a broadly Marxist
approach to environmental studies in American sociology. The metabolic rift was
the right idea at the right time. The clarity of Foster’s conceptualization—along
with its relevance in an era of planetary crisis—gave the socio-metabolic re-reading
of Marx considerable influence. It valorized a broadly critical political economy of
global environmental change. It emphasized a historical perspective on environ-
mental change. And it made clear that Marx’s thinking on humanity’s metabolism
in the web of life offers indispensable tools in forging a revolutionary critique of
capitalism, and for elaborating emancipatory vistas. These are important
contributions.
That influence brought Marx’s socio-ecological imagination to a wide audience. But
success came at a price. Influenced by Foster’s reading of social metabolism as a rift of
“nature and society”—rather than society-in-nature—Marx’s ecological thinking came
to be narrowly understood, more or less cordoned off from the critique of political
economy. “The” environment became just another—albeit a major—analytical object
for Marxists. It did not compel a fundamental rethinking of how capital accumulation
1 Key texts include Foster 1999, 2000a, b, 2009; Foster et al. 2010; Moore 2000a; Clark and York 2005.
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works, how it booms, and how it develops through accumulation crises—the core
concerns of Marxist political economy. No major scholar represents this divide better
than Foster, for whom the unflinching defense of the theory of monopoly capital
couples with an equally vigorous defense of an ecologically-informed historical mate-
rialism—with very little cross-fertilization.
“The environment” has been incorporated within Marxism’s remit. Nature’s incor-
poration, however, has occurred through addition rather than synthetic transformation.
If environmentalist thought has long emphasized separation—Society and Nature—
Marx’s thinking pivots on relationality, movement, and differentiated unities. Nowhere
is this clearer than when Marx accounts for the labor process as a triple transformation:
of human nature, of “external nature,” and of the relations of the mode of the
production, the “life-process of society” (Marx 1977, p. 283; Marx 1967, I, pp. 84).
Marx is emphatic on the point. Work is the activity of human nature internal to the web
of life; labor-power is a “specifically harnessed natural force” (Marx 1973, p. 612).
This essay pursues an entwined critique and reconstruction: of metabolic rift
thinking, and the possibilities for a post-Cartesian perspective on historical change,
embodied in the world-ecology conversation (Moore 2015a). Far from dismissing
metabolic rift thinking, my intention is to affirm its dialectical core. At stake is not
merely the mode of explanation within environmental sociology. The impasse of
metabolic rift thinking is suggestive of wider problems across the environmental social
sciences, now confronted by a double challenge. One of course is the widespread—and
reasonable—sense of urgency to evolve modes of thought appropriate to an era of
deepening biospheric instability. The second is the widely recognized—but inadequate-
ly internalized—understanding that humans are part of nature (Moore 2015a).
To this end, I foreground two pivotal questions, implicit in—but not engaged by—
Rift arguments. One major question turns on Nature/Society dualism and the problem
of post-Cartesian thought (e.g., Bennett 2009; Braun and Castree 1998; Cronon 1995;
Haraway 1991, 2016; Harvey 1993; Latour 1993; Williams 1980). Is agriculture—
central to the first wave of Rift analyses—a combination of social and ecological
elements? If so, how does one draw that line in a non-arbitrary fashion? Or is it more
adequately considered as a relational configuration, of how humans have mixed their
“labor with the earth” (Williams 1980, p. 83)? Rift arguments have sidestepped that
question. In Rift models, the relations between basic units—Nature/Society and their
specifications—may shift, but the constitution of these units remains outside their
interaction. We might call this procedure dualist practicality. In their embrace of Green
Arithmetic—Nature plus Society—Rift analysts are “at least indirectly, and in effect,
‘accepting’ the [intellectual] framework” of modernity, even as they seek to challenge it
(Mills 1959, p. 78).
Green Arithmetic rules out a view of class, capital, and empire as co-produced in the
web of life. More problematic still, Foster explicitly defends an approach that begins
with Nature/Society abstractions, a procedure that short-circuits relational approaches
to human history in the web of life (2013; e.g., Moore 2015a; Haraway 2016). There
are two meta-theoretical issues here. One is a debate over human sociality and its
identity with Society. Human sociality is fundamentally a multi-species affair: try
narrating human history abstracted from dogs, rice, pigs, or maize. The second is a
debate on whether or not one may abstract geographical relations, configurations, and
conditions from conceptualizations of historical change. Can one dispense with
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geography in conceptualizing capitalism’s histories, or are such geographies an onto-
logical condition of historical change? Dualist practicality affirms the identity of human
sociality with Society, and the excision of geography from concepts of historical
change. For these reasons, such practicality undermines research programs that might
illuminate the mutual constitution of human organization within the web of life.
A second set of questions unfolds from the first. If humans are part of the web of life
– and if the web of life permeates every nook and cranny of human relations – what
does that mean for the history of the modern world, and for its longue durée political
economy? These are the questions taken up by the world-ecology perspective. While
both history and political economy are invoked by Rift analysts, they have made little
headway in historical research, at times coming perilously close to structural-function-
alism, and have shown little interest in rethinking the theory of capital accumulation.
These two issues—of a broadly conceived environmental history and Red-Green
political economy—are posed directly by the world-ecology conversation, through
which capitalism is understood as an evolving totality of capital, power, and nature
(Moore 2015a; Patel and Moore 2017; Altvater 2016; Bolthouse 2014; Camba 2015;
Campbell 2016; Cox 2015; Deckard, 2016; Dixon 2015; El Khoury 2015; Frame 2016;
Gill 2016; Hartley 2016; Jakes, 2016; Marley 2016; McBrien 2016; Niblett and
Campbell 2016; Oloff 2016; Parenti 2015; Taylor 2015; Weis 2013).
Just how one goes about moving from the dualism of Humanity and Nature to the
dialectics of humanity-in-nature has been a vexing, and largely unresolved, problem for
Green Thought and critical theory since the 1970s. In what follows, I pursue the
dialectical synthesis suggested—but never realized—by Foster and the Rift perspective.
I unfold the outlines of this synthesis through a reconstruction of metabolism as a
means to unify, methodologically, the differentiated flows of capital, power, and life in
historical capitalism. If metabolism is not an exchange between quasi-independent
objects (Nature/Society) but rather a process of life-making within the web of life
new possibilities emerge. A conception of a singular, internally diverse, historically
variant and geographically uneven, metabolism of humanity-in-nature might allow us
to chart a course beyond dualism.
Metabolisms, Marxisms, & other mindfields
The turbulence of the twenty-first century poses a serious analytical challenge: How
does capitalism develop through nature and not just act upon it? Try drawing a line
around the “social” and “environmental” moments of financialization, global warming,
resurgent fundamentalisms, the rise of China—and much beyond. The exercise quickly
ends in futility. Not because these processes are “too complex,” but because the
conventional reckoning of Nature/Society yields the wrong questions—and the wrong
answers. Such questions and answers are premised on the idea of humanity’s practical
separation from the web of life.
But is not the inverse more plausible?
If “the truth is the whole” (Hegel), then the story of specific totalities—of
financialization or climate change or even historical capitalism—cannot be adduced
by aggregating environmental and social parts. For the “social” moment of these
processes is essentially co-produced and co-productive; it is a product of nature as a
288 Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318
whole. Far from blurring the specificity of “social” relations, such an approach
enhances our capacity to grasp their specificity. Consider, for instance, the formation
of new class, racial, and gender orders in the centuries after 1492. Could we really
explain the emergence of modern racism while bracketing the conquest and depopula-
tion of the Americas? Or while abstracting the sugar planting frontier’s ferocious record
of biogeographical transformation? Or not considering the hardening of the Human/
Nature divide in which most humans—women, peoples of color, and many others—
were expelled from Humanity with an uppercase ‘H’? The question of human sociality
(difference, conflict, and cooperation) remains at the center of such an alternative, but is
now situated within lively and unruly assemblages that enfold and unfold the organic
and inorganic, the human and the extra-human, the symbolic and the material (Birch
and Cobb 1981; Haraway 2016).
Situating human sociality within historical webs of power, capital, and nature
significantly shifts our explanatory problem. Out goes the problem of how humans
created Society separate from Nature. In comes a new set of questions, turning on
humanity’s patterns of difference, conflict, and cooperation within the web of life.
Financialization, in this light, is not a social process with environmental and social
“consequences”—consequences that subsequently issue social and environmental
“limits” and which might be remedied through social and environmental “justice.”
Financialization is, rather, a bundle of human and extra-human natures. Its claims on
future wealth involve claims on future capacities of human and extra-human work, and
its transmutation into capital.
The contradictions—the “laws of motion”—of such bundled processes are not
rooted in an abstract Society (in general) pressing against an equally abstract Nature.
They are, rather, rooted in the mosaic of modernity’s “double internality” (Moore
2015a, p. 3)—that is, in the ways that power and re/production are specifically bundled
within a web of life that makes humans and that humans make. (Hint: when humans
interact with other humans, we are—as any careworker and every parent can tell you—
dealing with unruly natures that defy the boundary Nature/Society.)
Put simply, humans are a part of nature. The totality of nature is immanent in
every human thought, organization, and movement. The statement is hardly
controversial. Most environmental studies scholars would agree… at least in
principle. It feels good to characterize “human society” as “internal to and
dependent upon [the] larger earthly metabolism” (Foster 2013, p. 8). And for
many scholars of global change, such feel-good statements are the end of the line.
It is decidedly less comfortable—and considerably more daunting—to rethink our
methodological frames, theoretical propositions, and narrative strategies in this
light. If not just humans, but human organizations, are products and producers of
extra-human nature, a fundamental rethinking of storytelling, concept formation,
and methodological orientation follows.
That such rethinking has made little headway until recently—with the explosion of
actor-network, assemblage, world-ecological, and multi-species perspectives—is hard-
ly surprising. For to move beyond Green Arithmetic in an analytical-empirical sense is
to challenge the very basis of the social sciences and their governing conceit: that
human activity is, for practical analytical purposes, “exempt” from the dynamics of the
web of life. In the logic of “human exemptionalism” (Dunlap and Catton 1979; also
Haraway 2008; Moore 2015a, b), relations between humans are ontologically
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independent of nature. Human exemptionalism allows one to speak of modernity as a
set of social relations that act upon, rather than develop through, the web of life. It
allows one to assume that history, at manifold temporal and spatial resolutions, unfolds
as a kind of ping-pong between “natural forces” and “human agency.”
Foster’s groundbreaking contribution was to use metabolism as a means of putting
work—the work of humans and the work of nature—at the center of the question of
nature, and therefore the history of capitalism. His formulation of metabolic rift marked
a kind of halfway house: between Cartesian and post-Cartesian social science. Within
the context of American sociology, Foster consciously aimed at transcending the limits
of human exemptionalism and establishing a research program grounded in classical
social theory, Marxism above all (1999). The conjuncture was fruitful. The rise of
environmental sociology in the 1970s had not changed the discipline. Marxism, too,
had yet to find its groove around ecological questions. By the late 1990s, however, the
conditions had ripened for the rise of metabolism as a “conceptual star” (Fischer-
Kowalksi 1997). A vigorous research program was established.
This conceptual star shaped a significant current within the environmental humanities
at the dawn of the twenty-first century. In distinct registers, metabolism strongly
influenced both Fischer-Kowalski’s neo-Malthusian “socio-metabolic” school and
Marxisante approaches to global environmental change (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl
1998; Foster 1999). Metabolism appeared to offer the possibility of fording the “Great
Divide” of Nature and Society (Goldman and Schurman 2000).
Foster’s early formulation of metabolism suggested how we might realize that
possibility (1999, 2000a). In emphasizing work, nature, and capital, Foster appeared
to propose a new method of bounding human and extra-human natures. Human-
initiated processes and relations could be situated within their internalization of partic-
ular extra-human natures, and within nature as a whole. At the same time, the biosphere
could be understood as internalizing elements of human-initiated process—obviously
an asymmetrical relation. Such a method would take seriously a messy process of co-
production, one that could move beyond re-branding Society as “human nature” and
Nature as “extra-human nature.” In such a reckoning, the perils of environmental
determinism and social reductionism would be transcended. Human “society” could
be understood as simultaneously a producer and product of the web of life, unevenly
co-produced and symbolically enabled. In so doing, the specific forms of human
sociality could be distinguished and analyzed in much more complex and nuanced
ways relative to those blunt instruments, Nature/Society. Metabolism, in this potential
synthesis, would bridge the Great Divide.
And yet, despite its appeal, such a synthesis never occurred. The bridge was never
built. Foster’s elaboration of metabolism and materialism quickly foreclosed the very
possibility of synthesis that it suggested. Marx’s “interdependent process of social
metabolism” was forced into a dualist frame: the “metabolism of nature and society”
(Marx 1981, p. 949; Foster 2000a: ch. 6, emphasis added). At the same time, Foster
encouraged a theoretical rift between historical materialism and critical political econ-
omy, underscored by a reluctance to develop the socio-ecological possibilities of
Marx’s theory of value. The dualism of Society (humans without nature) and Nature
(ecologies without humans) was not transcended.
Criticizing Western Marxism for banishing nature from dialectics, Foster established
a new Red-Green canon and drew a new cognitive map for ecological Marxism. The
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new Red-Green canon was notable not only for whom it included—but also for whom
it left out. Including such figures as Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, Stephen J.
Gould, and Barry Commoner, Foster excised many other leading critical thinkers of the
new environmental social sciences in the long 1970s: David Harvey, Neil Smith,
Michael Watts, Robert M. Young, and Carolyn Merchant, just for starters.2 Geogra-
phers have been unwelcome in Foster’s canon, and especially those closely associated
with David Harvey (see Foster and Clark 2016; Foster 2016a, b).3 The exclusion of
geographers—Foster cannot find a single geographer to credit with moving beyond
“first-stage eco-socialism” (Burkett and Foster 2016, pp. 3–4)—is important in its own
right. (Nor does Foster’s classic 1999 article make reference to a (then) quarter-century
of Marxist-influenced political ecology.)
This disciplinary exclusion had two major effects. First, Foster’s expulsion of
geographers from his version of ecological Marxism is tightly related to his procedure
of abstraction. For Foster, Society (and capitalism) can be conceptualized abstracted
from geographical relations and conditions. Just as no historian would accept ahistor-
ical conceptions of social change—say, crude versions of modernization or demo-
graphic transition theory—no geographer would accept a conception of Society ab-
stracted from geography. Secondly, the refusal of geographers to accept un-
geographical conceptions of Nature/Society relations has led to a broad skepticism
regarding dualism (see especially Watts 2005; e.g., Harvey 1995; Heynen et al. 2007;
Peet et al. 2011; Braun and Castree 1998). Foster’s reluctance to engage geographical
knowledges combines with a disciplinary insularity that has effectively removed him
from meaningful conversations with geographers and other scholars in the humanities
and social sciences who have made the “spatial turn” (e.g., Warf and Arias 2008).
Among the intellectual consequences is Foster’s unwillingness to discern social con-
structionist from materialist interpretations that differ from Rift interpretations. The
argument for historical-geographical materialism, for instance, privileges the
relationality of humanity-in-nature (and nature-in-humanity) in which material and
cultural transformations are entwined—without succumbing to idealism (Smith 1984;
Harvey 1995; Braun and Castree 1998; Moore 2015a). And yet, for Foster, all
deviations from his interpretation of Marx are idealist and constructionist. Critics of
the Rift are less-than-truly Marxist (e.g., Foster 2013, 2016a, b; Foster and Clark 2016).
The evaluative process is black and white, either/or—interpretative differences are cast
into the cauldron of Cartesian rationality, boiling down all difference into binary
categories.
Foster’s Red-Green canon has evolved alongside a new cognitive map of Nature and
Society. Thanks to Foster and others, Nature earned a place within Marxism—and even
beyond. On offer, however, was a narrow interpretation ofMarx’s thinking about the web
2 Representative texts include Harvey (1974), Merchant (1980), Young (1979), Watts (1983), and Smith
(1984).
3 Foster (2013a, p. 9) presents Harvey as arguing for nature as an “outer boundary” (2013, p. 9)—a position
that distorts Harvey’s actual position. Harvey holds to a strongly relational view of socio-ecological relations
in which “all ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously political-economic projects (and
arguments) and vice versa” (1993, p. 25; also 1995). An analogous misreading is found in Foster’s
appropriation of my conception of epochal crisis (Moore, 2011a, b), which he describes as the “convergence
of economic and ecological contradictions” (2013b, p. 1). These appropriations indicate Foster’s unwillingness
to engage the relational critique on its own terms.
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of life (Moore 2015a). Foster saw nature as Nature, with an emphatically uppercase
‘N.’ Dualism had won the day. Rift as metaphor of separation, premised on material
flows between Nature and Society, triumphed. The accomplishment was mighty, but so
was the cost. Pushed to the side was a vision of metabolism as a means of unifying
humans within nature, unfolding through combined and uneven metabolisms of power,
wealth, and nature. The dualist conception of metabolism and its rifts influenced a
decade and more of critical environmental studies, especially within environmental
sociology.
This was perhaps not a significant problem for the first decade of the twenty-first
century. New interpretations and empirical analyses poured forth. By 2010, however, it
began to look as if Rift arguments had explained about as much as they could within
Green Arithmetic’s constraints (e.g., Foster et al. 2010). Rift analysts had largely
completed the work of mapping capitalism’s environmental problems—but the additive
character of that project constrained its ability to explain how capitalism develops
through a co-productive dynamic, one in which it is both producer and product of the
web of life.
The metabolic rift perspective is not alone in this—Green Thought’s signal
accomplishment, from the 1970s, was to fill in and flesh out the blank spots in
the human exemptionalist cognitive map. Like Green Thought as a whole, Rift
arguments were caught in a powerful contradiction: a “double yes” (Moore
2015a). Are humans part of nature? Yes. Can we analyze human organizations
as if they are independent of nature? Yes. Metabolism-centered studies, like
much of critical environmental studies, face an unresolved contradiction: be-
tween a philosophical-discursive embrace of a relational ontology (humanity-in-
nature) and a practical-analytical acceptance of Nature/Society dualism (dualist
practicality). It has been one thing to affirm and explore the ontological and
epistemological questions (e.g., Bennett 2009).4 But how does one move from
seeing human organization as part of nature towards an effective—and practi-
cable—analytical program?
Metabolisms unfolding: chaotic conceptions and the epistemic rift
That question is ruled out by the very terms of the metabolic rift. Emphasizing
disruption and separation, rather than reconfiguration and unity, the metabolic
rift has come to signify “a disruption in the exchange between social systems
and natural systems” (York 2010; also Foster 2013, p. 8). Social systems are
separate from natural systems. Social systems disrupt natural systems. As
capitalism develops, the disruption of nature widens and escalates, leading to
“planetary crisis.” Catastrophe ensues.
It all makes a certain amount of sense. But is it good sense? Is nature really best
considered as external to capitalism? Or are capitalism and its limits co-produced
through shifting configurations of human and extra-human nature?
4 The critique of nature/society dualism is vast. Classic statements include Smith (1984); Plumwood (1993);
Braun and Castree (1998). Descartes is simply one of several possible names for the kind of dualism that
emerged with the rise of capitalism in the early modern era (Moore 2015a).
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Among Nature/Society dualism’s essential features is the tendency to circumscribe
truth-claims by drawing hard-and-fast lines between what is Social and what is Natural.5
Here is a rift: an epistemic rift.6 At its core is a series of violent abstractions implicated in
the creation and reproduction of two separate epistemic domains: Nature and Society
(again in the uppercase). The abstractions are “violent” because they remove essential
relations from each node in the interests of narrative and theoretical coherence (Sayer
1987). Dialectical abstractions, in contrast, begin with historical movement and strategic
historical relations—something conspicuously absent from Nature/Society.
The procedure of abstraction is central to Marx’s method, with implications that go
far beyond philosophy (Ollman 2003). How we abstract reality into semi-fixed cate-
gories shapes our interpretation; analytics in turn shape politics and policy. This is why
Foster’s defense of Nature/Society as appropriate abstractions—strikingly at odds with
Marx’s method—is so curious (Foster 2013). Nature/Society are undialectical abstrac-
tions. They are no more dialectical than, say, “the market” and “industry,” or “popu-
lation” and “environment.” At best, these are chaotic conceptions, as Marx would say
(1973, p. 100).
Such chaotic conceptions are violent in Sayer’s sense of the term—but also in a more
practical sense. The language of Nature and Society is hardly value-neutral. Environ-
mental sociology, in particular, has yet to experience its Bourdieu-ian moment, “reflex-
ively” grasping the degree to which Nature/Society embody arbitrary yet patterned
relations of power (Bourdieu andWacquant 1992). While a distinction between humans
and the rest of nature antedates capitalism by millennia (Arnold 1996), the elevation of
Nature/Society to a civilizational organizing principle did not occur until the “long”
sixteenth century (Braudel 1953; Wallerstein 1974; Moore 2016a). This is no mere
quibble over terms. Cartesian dualism as a system of thought—and as a conceptual
vocabulary—has been a quite palpable force in the making of the modern world. Nature
and Society have been real abstractions—abstractions with operative force in the
material world (Sohn-Rethel 1978; Toscano 2016). These and cognate terms, clustered
in early modern Europe around “civility” and “barbarism” or “savagery,” implicated a
new ways of thinking… and a new civilizational praxis: Cheap Nature.
The birth of these real abstractions, Nature and Society, was consolidated in early
capitalism (Merchant 1980; Moore 2015a). In the centuries after 1450, capital, science,
and empire enacted a series of socio-ecological and symbolic revolutions aimed at the
creation of an “external” nature as a source of cheap inputs (Moore 2014, 2015a).What
is crucial to understand is that “Nature” in the rise of capitalism came to include the
vast majority of humans within its geographical reach.
Nature—again our uppercase “N”—was fundamental to capitalism from the begin-
ning. The Columbian rupture of 1492 marked not only the “discovery” of the
Americas, but the “discovery of Mankind”—and with it, Nature (Albuafia 2008;
Mumford 1934). For the Columbian conquests were not merely exterminist and
plundering; their epochal significance derives also from ambitious imperial projects
to map and catalogue productive natures of every kind (Blechmar et al. 2009). The
project proceeded through the assumption that Nature included indigenous peoples.
5 Harvey offers the clearest exposition of this critique (1993).
6 The term is indebted to Schneider and McMichael (2010), whose formulation is, however, distinct from
epistemic rift as epistemological dualism.
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The overseas empires, beginning with the Iberian powers, “collected, harnessed,
and ordered (natural) things as they tried to construct and control (knowledge
about) the natural world.” These “practices included the collecting of humans,
that is (savage) bodies, as fungible commodities to be classified and exploited”
(Modest 2012, p. 86).
The newly discovered Mankind was of a piece with early modernity’s epis-
temological and ontological revolution, creating Nature as external to civiliza-
tion and subordinating it to new “measures of reality”—above all the primacy of
visual knowledges embodied in the cartographic gaze and new procedures of
quantification (Crosby 1997; Mumford 1934). At best, the paired “discovery” of
Mankind and Nature was less anthropocentric than it was Manthropocentric—to
borrow Raworth’s apt turn of phrase (2014; see Federici 2004; Merchant 1980).
At its core was an always-contested boundary between which humans counted as
Human and which would be forcibly resettled into the zone of Nature. The
conquest of the Americas and the paired “discoveries” of Nature and
Humanity/Society were moments of a singular movement.
Colonialism, ethnic cleansing, and the emergence of Nature as a violent and
real abstraction co-evolved from the very beginning. During the protracted
conquest of the Canaries, Portugal’s King Duarte put the issue starkly
(1436): Canarians are “nearly wild men … living in the country like animals”
(quoted in Hulme 1994, p. 187). The same discourse characterized English rule
in Ireland a century later (Rai 1993). Ethnic cleansing—typically in the name
of “taking away their inhumanity” (Sued-Badillo 1992)—was the order of the
day in the three great military campaigns culminating in the Columbian inva-
sions. The final waves of conquest of the Canaries (1478–1490s) and Granada
(1482–1492)—which cash-strapped Castile and Aragon financed largely
through slaving—were key moments in an emergent capitalism installing and
reproducing a Humanity/Nature binary through an equally emergent racialized
and gendered order (Nader 2002; Kicza 1992).
The earliest moments of conquest were effected through a radical inversion
of land/labor arrangements—underscored by the overnight reinvention of the
encomienda, from a medieval land grant and to a precociously modern labor
grant. Indigenous peoples became de facto slaves, while the booming sugar
plantation complex pioneered modern slavery de jure—tentatively at first in
Madeira, and reaching critical mass in Brazil after 1600. An African slave was
part of Nature—not Society—in the new order. Here Patterson’s characteriza-
tion of modern slavery as “social death” receives a post-Cartesian twist (1982).
Most human work was not labor-power and therefore most humans within
capital’s gravitational pull were not, or not really, Humans. This meant that
the realm of Nature encompassed virtually all peoples of color, most women,
and most people with white skin living in semi-colonial regions (e.g., Ireland,
Poland, etc.) (von Werlhof, 1988; Rai 1993). Not for nothing did Castilians
refer to indigenous Andeans in the sixteenth century as naturales (Stavig
2000). The problem with Nature and Society is not merely discursive—they
are real abstractions with real force in the modern world we now inhabit.
Primitive accumulation therefore yielded not only bourgeois and proletarian,
but Society and Nature. This is not a rhetorical flourish. The binary tendency
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of modern class formation and the dualism of Society and Nature reinforced
each other in the rise of capitalism (Moore 2015a, 2016b, 2017a, b).
We can see this close relationship with the evolution of the word Society. Society
begins to assume its modern English usage—as national collectivity—from the mid-
sixteenth century (Williams 1983, p. 292; also OED 2016). The timing is significant. At
precisely this point, following Kett’s Rebellion (1549), the tide of agrarian class struggle
shifted decisively in favor of the gentry (Wood 2007). By 1700, England’s landlords held
two-thirds of arable land (Thompson 1966). Nor was it coincident that this period saw,
from 1541, the intensification of English colonial rule in Ireland (Ohlmeyer 2016).
Through all this, the Irish (and later North America’s indigenous peoples), the poor, most
women, and many others came to be viewed as “savages” of one sort of another—a view
that justified all manner of bloody expropriations (Leerssen 1995;Moore 2016b). Here we
begin to see modernity’s emergent epistemic rift practically bound to capitalism as
ontological formation—as a world-ecology of power, capital, and nature. The cheap
nature strategy had become pivotal to the audacious restructuring of human relations
along modern—and powerfully dualist—lines of class, race, and gender.7
Modernity’s epistemic rift is premised on the creation of two idealized and indepen-
dent objects of investigation: Nature/Society. The binary is so resilient because its
underlying ontology is mechanical, which corresponds remarkably well with capitalist
rationality via the quantism of capital in its monetary and productivist forms (currency
units, units of labor-power, etc.). In the dualist cognitive map, environmental “factors”
are easily tacked onto the analysis of social processes—just what has occurred through
Marxist Green Arithmetic. Phrases like “nature-society dialectic” (e.g., Foster 2013)
confuse relations for dialectics, and general abstractions and empirical patterns (e.g.,
Nature/Society) for the “developing tendencies of history” (Lukács 1971, p. 184).
Nature and Society can only be a dialectic—as opposed to a relation—through a
specification of their laws of motion. Capital/labor is a dialectical relation for this very
reason: it is asymmetrical and grounded in a historical-geographical movement of
transcendence. At once producer and product of the town/country antagonism (its
geographical moment), the capital/labor dialectic entails the undoing of an originary
asymmetry in favor of a new synthesis: “the expropriators are expropriated” (Marx
1977, p. 929). Rift arguments, however, deploy Nature/Society very differently, as
basic units rather than interpenetrating relations (Levins and Lewontin 1985). Nature as
a general abstraction—like population or production in general (Marx 1973)—
dominates.
As if to move from the frying pan into the fire, Rift analysts dismiss as idealist
efforts to historicize the capitalism-nature relation (e.g., through integrating accounts of
science and culture in successively dominant understandings of the web of life) (e.g.,
Foster and Clark 2016). The result is a twofold conception of history shaped by a
declensionist Fall from Eden and the inexorable drive towards catastrophe in which
capital accumulation will proceed until “the last tree has been cut” (Foster 2009, p.
206). No one disputes the reality of socio-ecological disaster, planetary change, and
limits—notwithstanding Foster’s insistence to the contrary (2016, 2017). In dispute is,
rather, how we think planetary crisis, and the relations of nature as a whole and
capitalism as a whole. In this respect, Rift analyses have resisted the tendency of
7 My concept of ontological formation draws on James’s groundbreaking work (2015).
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dialectical praxis to dissolve its analytical objects, and to create new categories suitable
to comprehending the historically successive interpenetrations of humans with the rest
of nature.
The metabolic rift: results and prospects
Foster began with a conception of capitalism that reached beyond Nature/Society.
Precociously, Foster argued that environmentalist politics could go nowhere without
grasping environmental problems as class problems (1993). He argued for an “absolute
general law of environmental degradation,” rendering the combined and uneven
movements of pollution and depletion immanent to capital accumulation (1992). Most
significantly, Foster saw environment-making as fundamental to capitalist develop-
ment. In The Vulnerable Planet, he perceptively observes an epochal shift in
humanity’s relation to the rest of nature during the long sixteenth century—later
amplified by the Industrial Revolution—and that eras of capitalism were bound up
with new ways of organizing nature (1994).
Foster first formulated the metabolic rift in a now-classic article published in 1999.
Three dimensions of capitalism’s rift were central. First, there is a “rift between human
production and its natural conditions” (Foster 1999, p. 370). Second, there is a
“material estrangement [alienation] of human beings in capitalist society from the
natural conditions of their existence” (ibid., p. 383). And third, this rift finds its decisive
geographical expression in the “antagonistic division between town and country” (ibid.,
p. 384). Foster initially used the rift in metabolic rift to signify the channeling of food
and resources produced in agrarian zones into urban and industrial spaces. Although
metabolic rift today is widely understood as a metaphor of separation, the original
argument seemed to suggest something different: rift as reconfiguration and shift.
That initial formulation was quickly complemented byMarx’s Ecology (Foster 2000a), a
landmark in the development of Red-Green Thought. Marx’s Ecology advances a simple
and powerful model. Food and resources, produced in the countryside, are consumed in the
cities. Food eaten in the cities is not returned—aswaste—to the fields; forests are claimed for
fuelwood and construction with no biophysical recycling; minerals are extracted with no
possibility for their renewal. These reconfigurations of nutrient, mineral, and energy flows
were pivotal—not auxiliary—to the ongoing separation of the direct producers from the
means of production (primitive accumulation). Thus did the rise of capitalism imply a new
geography of wealth and power in which metabolism was immanent to relations of class,
state, and value (Foster 2000a, pp. 170–173). In Foster’s reading, any attempt to separate the
history of class, state, and production from metabolic flows was irremediably partial.
This metabolic shift was, moreover, implicated in a new crystallization of wealth: value
as abstract social labor (Foster 2000a, pp. 133, 167–167, 285n). Here, Foster follows Marx
in seeing the rise of capitalism as tightly linked to an epochal shift in the town-country
division of labor (Marx and Engels 1970). This is the “urbanisation of the countryside”: the
tendential expansion of bourgeois property relations into agrarian spaces, whose “urbanisa-
tion” is the condition for the generalization of commodity production and exchange (Marx
1973, pp. 479, 459; also 1977, Part 8). 8 Crucially, Foster conceived of capitalism’s
8 This socio-ecological dimension of urbanization is effectively pursued by Neil Brenner and his colleagues
(2013).
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metabolism as an open-flow system, vitally dependent upon frontier expansion—in this
instance the cascading movement of primitive accumulation, subsequently encompassing
the colonial world, as in the nineteenth-century Anglo-Peruvian guano trade and America’s
antebellum agricultural frontiers (2000a, pp. 149–154).
This conception of metabolic rift compelled a radical rethinking of the history of
capitalism, as I argued at the time (Moore 2000a, 2000b). Foster’s principal historical
claim turned on agro-urban nutrient cycling. This struck me as undeniably pivotal,
offering a means of “ecologizing” the agricultural revolution models on both sides of
the transition debate (e.g., Brenner 1976; Wallerstein 1974; see Moore 2003a, 2003b).
Although Foster’s primary historical example of the metabolic rift focused on
nineteenth-century developments—England’s “second” agricultural revolution—he
understood that capitalism emerged through an earlier succession of metabolic rifts.9
Those earlier metabolic revolutions could be seen at work in the long sixteenth
century (Moore 2010a, 2010b). Although urban-industrial wastes were sometimes
recycled in early capitalism—the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic is a good exam-
ple—we can see the metabolic rift at work as capitalists (Dutch especially) extracted
nutrients from countrysides near and far, and concentrated pollution in the cities (de
Vries and van der Woude 1997, pp. 202–204). Even before the Industrial Revolution,
air pollution was a problem in some European cities: Amsterdam’s city council banned
the use of coal in sugar refining in 1614 (Braudel 1982, p. 193). Meanwhile, Polish
agriculture, which fed Amsterdam, was re-shaped into an agro-export zone under
Dutch hegemony. Not surprisingly, Polish agriculture experienced sharply declining
agricultural productivity by the mid-seventeenth century (Moore 2010b). As England
become Europe’s breadbasket after 1700, we see a similar dynamic at play—English
agriculture was exhausted by 1760 and grain exports ceased (Moore 2016b). This
relation of nutrient exhaustion and urbanization is Foster’s “absolute general law of
environmental degradation” (1992), whose contradictions issue “successive, historical
breaks in nutrient cycling” (1999, p. 399; also Foster and Magdoff 1998; Moore
2000a).
Foster, in this early formulation, recognizes a metabolic rift “in general” and a
succession of metabolic rifts specific to capitalism’s uneven geographies. This is a
move familiar to students of Marx’s method. One moves from general to successively
more determinate (specific) abstractions (Murray 1988; Sayer 1987). Nature in general,
population in general, metabolism in general—these are no more adequate for historical
explanation than the concept of “production in general” (Marx 1973, pp. 85–86).
General abstractions steadily yield to abstractions grounded in capitalism’s historical
relations. One thinks, for instance, of the various conceptions of production mobilized
to interpret neoliberal globalization: flexible accumulation, lean production, just-in-
time production, and so forth. Contrast this with the Rift conceptions of nature, in the
neoliberal era and well before: nature in general.
The metabolic rift perspective has largely ignored this element of Marx’s method. To
be sure, Rift analysts frequently invoke history, but in the sense of accumulating
empirical facts. A sustained engagement with historical questions—especially those
9 We are, Foster writes, dealing with a “succession of metabolic rifts. The second agricultural revolution,
however useful in understanding this process, is just one stage” (personal communication, Foster to Moore, 20
January, 2000).
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posed by environmental historians of agrarian change (e.g., Merchant 1980, 1989;
Worster 1990; Cronon 1991)—has been sorely lacking. It is not clear to what degree
this ahistorical tendency reflects contingent factors (e.g., scholarly interests) or disci-
plinary conventions, and to what degree it is immanent in the perspective. At best, we
can say that history is consumed but not produced by Rift analysts. Nor does this
consumption run deep: historiographies are rarely engaged, and the sources of historical
evidence are thin.10 (Not just geographers, but historians too are excluded from Foster’s
Red-Green canon.) When historical case studies are offered, as we shall see, they are
situated within a larger descriptive category (a “global metabolic rift”) that is the
product of abstract generalization rather than dialectical reconstruction (e.g., Clark
and Foster 2009; Longo and Clark 2012). In dialectical constructions, we would expect
to find the concept of the whole (the global metabolic rift) revised through a method the
follows the movements of parts and wholes through time, space, and nature (Hopkins
1982). With abstract generalization, we find little modification of the initial concept of
the whole. In such instances, the concept becomes a box to fill with evidence: an
“ecological rift.”
I write these words having spent much of the decade following Foster’s 1999 article
wrestling with the “metabolism of nature and society” in historical explanation.
Initially, I followed closely in Foster’s footsteps. I identified biophysical changes—in
soil fertility and deforestation—as decisive factors in the geographical expansion of
early capitalism (Moore 2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). After a certain point,
however, I found that this arithmetic—economy plus environment—could not explain
early capitalism’s dynamism. For one, changes at the point of commodity production
were simultaneously human, as well as extra-human. The metabolic “rupture” in
nutrient cycling was not at all limited to nutrients. Work was central—and that work
implicated not just the bodies of workers in the immediate process of production, but
family life and the more expansive relations of reproductive labor. Flows of humans,
and their intergenerational and daily reproduction of life (and labor-power), were
transformed in a manner that did not fit the dualist frame of social and natural
metabolisms. The large-scale resettlement of Andean populations following 1571, for
instance, was premised on the need to supply cheap labor-power to the great silver
mines of Potosí.11 A long-run demographic exhaustion ensued, one turning rather more
on shift than rift: cascading socio-ecological transformations of land, labor, and com-
munity (2010b, 2010e). It was a process that defied any neat and tidy boundary
between two metabolisms. (Incidentally, such binaries are consistently opposed by
Andeans to this day.) Here a singular metabolism of production and reproduction was
at work.
I grew more skeptical as I discovered how one dualism quickly led to others. The
Rift’s Nature/Society dualism was paired with another: base/superstructure. As one
engages the history of capitalism, not as a general model but as a series of historical
patterns and punctuated developments, it becomes clear that ideas and symbolic praxis
matter deeply to the unfolding of systemic metabolisms. There is, then, a counterpoint
10 Thus Clark and Foster (2010) discuss the transition from feudalism to capitalism by citing the philosopher
Mészáros.
11 Indeed, the history of labor reserves often reveals a strikingly similar historical-geographical resemblance to
the history of agro-ecological change and extraction; the two are best viewed as internally relational to each
other (Meillasoux 1981; Moore 2015a, pp. 221–240).
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to Foster’s important account of the development of materialist thought in the modern
world (2000a): this is the emergence of modern science as a force of production (Moore
2015a, pp. 193–217; Brockway 1978). The rise of capitalism as an economic and
territorial project was, at every turn, enabled by a series of botanical, cartographic,
mathematical, and other scientific revolutions, broadly conceived. The first thing that
every European empire did was to establish means of mapping space and Nature, what
Cañizares-Esguerra aptly calls the “primitive accumulation of botanical knowledge”
(2004). The rise of calculative rationality, the mapping of abstract space, the formali-
zation of abstract time through mechanical clocks—all these and other “measures of
reality” were central to the emergence of capitalism as a system of cheap nature
(Crosby 1997; Mumford 1934; Cosgrove 2008; Moore 2015a, pp. 193–217).
In place of an economy/ecology ping-pong of consequences and restructuring—my
point of departure—a different picture began to emerge. I came to see the rise of
capitalism as a set of cascading material-symbolic processes cutting across and
destabilizing the Cartesian’s divide’s tidy boundaries: the transformations of land-
scapes, the restructuring of village and family life, the production of scientific knowl-
edges, new cartographies and map consciousness, innovations in production and
exchange, the emergence of new forms of state and imperial power. These constituted
an evolving totality in which capitalist and territorialist agencies sought to remake the
relations between humans and the rest of nature. At the same time, this grand project to
reshape the world in service to capital accumulation was also shaped by all manner of
unruly natures, from diseases to slave and peasant revolts to the Little Ice Age (Moore
2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010d, 2010e, 2016b, 2017a).
Absent sustained historical analysis, socio-metabolic dualism has underemphasized
the active role of extra-human natures in historical change. A Vampire Model domi-
nates: planetary nature appears mainly as something to be sucked dry by capital. Here is
a disruptionist perspective: “Natural” systems are disrupted by “social” systems (Clark
and York 2005; Clausen and Clark 2005; Longo 2012; Mancus 2007; Foster 2013).
The language is illuminating. Society disrupts Nature. Nature reacts to Society. Here is
mechanical, not dialectical, reason. In this view, disruption rests upon humanity’s
special (and in my view unwarranted) ontological status: when humans alter ecosystem
flows they disrupt, but when beavers change stream flows by making dams they are
natural? There is—of course!—a mighty difference between these two forms of
environment-making; the point is that recourse to disruption defaults to a view of
nature as pristine and essentially ahistorical, one in which human use is impossible to
distinguish from capitalist transformation.12
In this respect, Clark and York amplify the soft dualism of Foster’s early formulation
of the metabolic rift. For the former, disruption implies and necessitates an external,
separate, relation of the acting unit (“capital” or “society”) to the system being
disrupted (York 2010). This entails a concept of capitalism as ontologically indepen-
dent of nature—the consequences of the “law of value” may be asserted, but the origin
of the law of value as such is treated as a kind of Cartesian Virgin Birth.
This overlooks a crucial civilizational choice. Capitalism’s distinctiveness rests upon
its capacity to appropriate uncapitalized natures—including unpaid human work—in
order advance labor productivity within a narrow sphere (the zone of commodification).
12 Fundamental critiques of pristine nature in historical studies include Cronon (1995) and Williams (1980).
Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318 299
This cheap nature orientation revealed itself in the audacious landscape transformations
of the early modern era—outstripping, by an order of magnitude, the scale, scope, and
speed of pre-capitalist environment-making (Moore 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2015a,
2016a, 2017a). A focus on “environmental” consequences rather than the socio-
ecological constitution of modernity’s relations of power and re/production is certainly
permissible. The difficulty emerges when it becomes a bias that blinds the analyst to
how imperialism, or industrialization, or world hegemonies are not merely producers
but products of a web of life that includes humans. To be sure, consequences matter.
But if all one sees are consequences, there is a problem; causation and consequence
enfold each other.
Green Thought’s consequentialist bias has not stopped Rift analysts from speaking
of the “nature-society dialectic.” The language—“nature-society dialectic”—is under-
standable. Many of us in critical environmental studies have been striving for a
dialectical approach to history in the web of life. At best, the phrase is a placeholder.
And as a placeholder, it has encouraged a mighty confusion: between dialectics and
interaction. The two are not synonymous. Interaction does not require mutual determi-
nation. Dialectics, however, requires not only mutual determination but also
historically-grounded asymmetries (capital/labor, town/country, value/use-value, etc.)
whose contradictions, ultimately, negate the original terms of the dialectic. Capital/
labor, for instance, is understood dialectically as a relation that unfolds historically,
such that labor’s (hypothetical) triumph transcends the capital/labor relation. In Rift
arguments, however, the dialectics of transcendence, of moving beyond, seldom
appear. Dialectics too often appears as window dressing for denunciations of capital-
ism, which unfortunately say too little about how capitalism is co-produced by the rest
of nature. We are instead offered a uni-directional model of “capitalism’s war on the
earth” and told of the coming “catastrophe” (Foster et al. 2010). In this rhetorical
flourish we find a radical inflection of the ecological footprint metaphor (Wackernagel
and Rees 1996), in which humans leave their mark on an “ecology” that is little more
than passive mud and dirt. Even when asserting that humans are a part of nature, the
language of Nature/Society freezes precisely what a dialectical method would loosen.
The inner connections between what looks social and what looks ecological cannot
be located either by the “social cause-environmental consequence”model or its inverse.
The boundary-setting procedure between the two can, however, be “incorporated” into
the mode and method of analysis—just as an earlier generation of scholars incorporated
national units into the study of transnational social change (McMichael 1990). Such a
method allows the boundaries of the “social” and the “environmental” to dissolve
through historical research. This is the movement from general to determinate abstrac-
tion and from the environmental histories of capitalism to capitalism as environmental
history.
Historical change as environmental history—this sounds good, but remains pitched
at a high level of abstraction. For a way of looking at—and dissolving the firewalls
between—Nature and Society implies not only a philosophical and methodological
alternative, but also a mode of theorizing. That mode pivots on the co-productions of
humanity-in-nature and nature-in-humanity: the double internality.
Just how to bind this double internality in a non-reductionist way is unclear. One
way forward is found in Foster’s early formulation of metabolic rift (2000a; also
Burkett 1999). In Foster’s hands, the law of value—at least implicitly (2000a, pp.
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167–168)—assumes particular geographical forms, above all in the town-country
dialectic within states, and between metropole and colony on a world-scale
(1999, p. 384). For Marx, and I think also for Foster, these geographical forms
are not epiphenomenal; they are dialectically joined to value as socio-ecological
project and process. Foster was, in other words, proposing the town-country
relation and its metabolism as pivotal geographical moments of the law of
value (Moore 2000a, 2011a, b).
The geographical-relational point cannot be overstated. The Rift is fre-
quently understood and utilized as a general abstraction—an “ecological
rift”—in terms of highly generalized push-pull of capitalist demands upon,
and specific “disruptions” of, the “natural metabolism” (Foster et al. 2010;
Clark and York 2005). The metabolic relation between specific geographical
forms and value relations has been thoroughly abstracted in these recent
arguments. A new general formula emerges: “the essence of a metabolic rift
is the rupture or interruption of a natural system” (ibid., p. 400)—an
argument that owes more to John Muir than to Karl Marx. Having established
a quasi-positivist generalization of metabolism, for instance, Clark and York
are able to re-insert value and space into the “general properties” of the
“metabolic rift between nature and society” (ibid., p. 391). It is, then, not
just nature that gets reduced to an additive factor in such accounts; so too is
time, space, and class—exactly what Marx synthesizes in his theory of value
(Harvey 1982; Burkett 1999). In the process, the historicity and spatiality of
Marx’s relational thinking is lost.
The perils of universalizing comparison: ecological imperialism
It is tempting to read Foster’s Rift argument as a conventional social scientist—as a
“concept-indicator approach” through which one deploys indicators of the “degree-of
or amount-of” Rift and ensuing degradation (Hopkins 1982, p. 201). Indeed this is what
the Rift has become. Rather than follow part-whole movements in successive determi-
nations and juxtapositions—through which the “whole” in question (the Rift) un-
dergoes qualitative transformation—Rift arguments have pursued a “general proper-
ties” approach (e.g., Clark and York 2005, p. 391). I do not think this is what Foster was
doing in Marx’s Ecology. Nevertheless, Rift arguments have morphed into a general-
izing narrative governed by a general abstraction: “a disruption of the interchange
between society and nature” (York 2007, p. 860). In this, particularity expresses
“qualities or tendencies preordained by a prior law” (Araghi and McMichael 2017).
“Prior law” manifests as a structurally invariant logic of capital, largely insulated from
regional changes that issue from this logic.13 One dualism—Nature/Society—finds a
comfortable bedfellow with another: the general and the particular.
13 Here is another blind-spot emerging from Foster’s distance from geographical thought. Regional-scale
socio-ecological transformations are deeply implicated in transformations of the capitalist world-ecology—not
only its booms but also its slumps—something the history of commodity frontiers makes plain (e.g., Moore
2003a, 2007, 2015a). Severing geography from the general model therefore leads not only to an exaggeration
of “social” over “ecological” moments but also to systemic determinism in which regional particularity and
change has little analytical traction.
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This generalizing approach flattens the historical narrative to one of cumulative
change, expressions of a secular capitalist logic. Such cumulative change is part of an
adequate historical geography of capitalism. Long-run patterns of proletarianization,
commercialization, and landscape change cannot be understood bereft of their cumu-
lative dimensions. But this can never be more than part of the story.
The Rift’s generalizing narrative elides two decisive phenomena. First, eras of
capitalist development are not reducible to the cumulative evolution of a
quantitatively-expanding world-system; phases of capitalist development imply and
necessitate moments of qualitative transformations (Arrighi 1994). (These are the
transformations narrated by the historiographies of “revolution”: scientific, industrial,
democratic, and otherwise.) Second, such qualitative transformations mark the transi-
tion from one crystallization of power, re/production, and nature to another in historical
capitalism (Moore 2011b).
In these transitions, strategic points of fracture in the capitalist world-ecology
may shift—sometimes rapidly, often unpredictably. Green Arithmetic gives us
two choices about these shifts: “environmental” or “social.” But when one
considers truly epoch-making eras of transition, we see that environmental
moments bundle with the social, and vice versa. What changes is the strategic
“bundle” of relations from one moment to the next. The story of the long
nineteenth-century’s Industrial Revolution, for instance, cannot be reduced to
“coal” and “colonies”—or more recently, to “coal” and the “class struggle”
(e.g., Pomeranz 2000; Malm 2016). This was an era in which the decisive
transformations—of agrarian class structures (and peasant revolts), technical
changes in industry (and labor unrest), territorial power and geopolitics, the
expansion of the world market—were bundled with (and within) nature at every
turn. In such conjonctures, the cyclical moment moves to center stage; the
contradictions of class, re/production, and empire unfold in ways that seldom fit
neatly with generalizing narratives—or with Green Arithmetic. Here we may
underscore how the flattening of historical time, issuing from a generalizing
narrative of metabolic rift, is closely linked to a flattening of geographical
space (“nature in general”). I have elsewhere characterized Rift analyses as
“lost in space” (Moore 2011a, b). It is more nearly accurate to say that these
analyses are lost without space. Environmental social science abstracted from
geographical difference is hobbled from the outset.
We are therefore dealing with a Rift perspective that is not only ontologi-
cally but methodologically dualist. The Cartesian dualism of Nature/Society is
bound to an epistemic dualism—of the general and the particular—characteristic
of positivism. Clark and Foster’s engagement with the history of imperialism is
a good example of this quasi-positivist construction. Ecological imperialism, for
Clark and Foster, “entails control over natural resources, creates asymmetries in
the exploitation of the environment and unequal exchange” (2009, p. 313; also
idem 2004, p. 187). This form of imperialism can be seen “all around us.... [in]
the invasion of occupation of Iraq ... the renewed scramble for Africa, the
flooding of the global commons with carbon dioxide, or biopiracy aimed at
Third World germplasm” (idem 2009, p. 311). Ecological imperialism, in this
scheme of things, is the “growth of the center of the system at unsustainable
rates, through the more thoroughgoing ecological degradation of the periphery”
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(ibid., p. 331). A capacious concept indeed! It leaves us with something of a
kitchen sink conception that goes everywhere and nowhere at once. No clear
line of historical investigation and interpretation is laid out, as a general notion
of ecological imperialism is presented—then collapsed—into a “global metabol-
ic rift” (ibid.).14
The mode of argumentation finds strong expression their favored case of the
nineteenth century’s Anglo-Peruvian guano trade. But it is far from clear what
this is a case of. Nowhere do we get something like a working set of causal
propositions regarding the historical sequences Foster and Clark seek to explain.
They overlay global metabolic rift and ecological imperialism upon an older
dependencia analysis without much cross-fertilization (e.g., Galeano 1973). It
is, moreover, difficult to see the difference between the two concepts—and the
processes they signify. On the one hand, we are told that the global metabolic
rift involves the transfer of “guano and nitrates … from Peru and Chile to
Britain (and other nations) in order to enrich their diminished soils” (Clark and
Foster 2009, p. 313). On the other hand, “the development of ecological
imperialism necessitated … an enormous net flow of ecological resources from
South to North” (ibid, p. 330). Is this nit-picky? I don’t think so. The authors
are not writing a world environmental history of the guano trade,15 but rather
pursuing a “larger theory of global metabolic rift, which captures the underlying
nature of the capitalist relation to the environment” (ibid.). Their ambition is
nothing short of transforming “Marxist theory as a whole” (idem 2004, p. 187).
My concern is not the mis-identification of descriptive categories for a “larger
theory,” but rather to ask, “What kind of historical explanation does this ‘larger
theory’ suggests?”
Two problems immediately present themselves, historical and geographical
in their respective turns. While Foster, Clark, and York refer to a global
metabolic rift, they deploy a generalized conception of the rift that confuses
level of abstraction and geographical scale (esp. York and Clark 2010a, b, p.
210 and passim). Global, in their hands, is not a geographical category but a
general assertion of how capitalism “creates a rift in our social metabolism
with nature” (Clark and York 2005, p. 399, emphases added). The “global”
is not constructed dialectically, as a real historical-geographical place with
distinctive patterns—and generative antagonisms—of culture, re/production,
governance, and exchange (Moore 2010a, 2010b; Taylor 1999). Rather, it is
asserted as a statement of general theory, subsequently valorized by the
empirical analysis of the particular. The ontology affects the historical narra-
tive: the conception of social relations as forming independently of the web
of life leads to a way of writing history in which an ontologically indepen-
dent “society” goes out into “nature” and does all sorts of terrible things.
This narrative—capitalism wreaking havoc with external nature—bears more than a
family resemblance to another narrative thread: capitalism forming within England, and
subsequently expanding, in the process “creating a global metabolic rift” (Clark and
14 Ibid. Such collapsing of general categories into an even more general category, with little sense of dialectical
abstraction, is a common procedure in rift analyses (see Clark and York 2013, 27ff).
15 On this history, see Mellilo’s exciting study (2015).
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Foster 2012, p. 72).16 The essential thrust of metabolic rift arguments about capitalism
and nature—the uni-directional impress of capital on external nature (Foster and
Holleman 2014, p. 228)—is recapitulated in the narrative: England developed capital-
ism first through its distinctive agricultural revolution, which upon finding its progress
stymied by soil fertility problems, “creates” a global metabolic rift by variously
“robbing” or “plundering” “distant regions” (Clark and Foster 2009, p. 312; idem,
2004, p. 193; York and Clark 2010a, b, p. 212).” Capital imposes its footprint on
“nature”; “core nations” impose their will upon the periphery.
“Global” or historical formation? agricultural revolution as metabolic
shift
It is of course true that capitalist relations of power and production encompassed, in a
very broad sense, most of the planet by the eve of World War I. And we know that this
entailed a new regime of global inequality (Davis 2001). This new regime encompassed
both quantitative and qualitative phenomena. The difficulty is that Rift approaches treat
neither history nor space as much more than quanta in their model, evacuating the
qualitative moment. Clark and Foster’s historical explanation of the “emergence” of a
global metabolic rift in the nineteenth century runs something like this. Soil exhaustion
within England drives the British Empire to find new sources of fertilizer, which leads
to the neo-colonial subordination of Peru, which leads to guano flowing from Peru back
to England. Hence, the global metabolic rift. National, global, plus ça change ...
Nothing really changes but the scale of activity. The global rift’s governing relations
do not change. The nineteenth-century geographical restructuring of capitalism, in this
interpretation, has no import on the relations of power and re/production. Space, like
nature, becomes a mere substrate upon which capitalist relations—“whether through
colonialism, imperialism, or market forces” (Clark and York 2012, p. 27)—impose
their logic.
I do not think such an approach adequately comprehends historical-geographical
change, arguably the core thematic of environmental studies. The conflation of the
“global” and the “general” in Rift arguments is but a salient example. In the first place,
it is reasonably clear that the historical-geographical processes Foster and his col-
leagues ascribe to the nineteenth century were in motion much earlier, certainly from
the “long” sixteenth century. The early modern intertwining of imperial power and
massive and rapid landscape transformation is a key moment of modern world histo-
ry—illuminated, above all, by the experience of the Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese
empires between 1450 and 1750. Such expansion encompassed commodity frontiers
16 York and Clark (2010a, b) are especially relaxed about historical specificity, invoking (but little beyond) to
the longue durée of historical capitalism. But the longue durée is invoked rather than integrated; it is simply a
“long time” for York and Clark, not a co-produced and multi-layered temporality (Braudel 2009). In the main,
Rift analyses evoke the idea of history without practicing historical analysis. My point is not topical (“they do
not study history”) but rather an observation of their theoretical praxis: the investigation of historical change
does not seem to alter their framework. For instance, the centrality of the “second” agricultural revolution in
metabolic rift thinking has been asserted with scarcely a nod to the historiography of English agriculture in the
nineteenth century. An alternative approach is Duncan’s (1996)—whose conclusions I do not share but whose
engagement with history and historiography is serious and sustained.
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within Europe as well as outside, from Bahia to the Baltic, and even as far afield as the
Moluccas in southeast Asia (Moore 2010a, 2010b, 2016b).
Second, the drive towards soil exhaustion is much more plastic and punctuated than
rift analysts suggest. We return to this issue below. The point I wish to underline is that
Rift scholars have converted a definite socio-ecological tendency into a universalizing
comparison, in which “every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially the same
rule” (Tilly 1984, p. 82). This approach runs directly counter to a historical method that
takes variation and divergence as its point of departure (e.g., Poly and Bournazel 1997;
Tomich 2004). The point is crucial, for it distinguishes a method that takes variation
and divergence as its starting point and one that is capacious enough to allow for
considerable wobble room—as is the case with the “ecological rift.” The universal
phenomenon of the metabolic rift can easily enlist highly variant empirical conse-
quences because it is so universal. Descriptively, then, the metabolic rift works well,
since fertility problems are endemic to agriculture—and not just capitalist agriculture.
In universalizing a particular moment (fertility and depletion), however, its explanatory
power is weakened. Commodity-oriented agriculture is not determined by soil fertility
directly, but rather through a spectrum of processes, including labor supplies, class
structure, chemical and mechanical forces of production, agronomy, etc. Soil fertility, in
turn, is doubly plastic, as what matters to any particular cultivator is the cost/price
spread and farm-level reproduction costs.17
Whether or not we are dealing with correlation or causation is difficult to say. Soil
and resource depletion can be seen everywhere, but its significance is nearly every-
where undertheorized (Engel-Di Mauro 2014). Environmental historiography goes far
towards describing such depletion (and much more than this), but has been reluctant to
build out explanatory models (Moore 2003a; but see Merchant 1989; Worster 1990).
Historical sociologists have sometimes gone further, as in Bunker and Ciccantell’s
argument for comprehending power, wealth, and ecology in the modern world through
capitalism’s “materio-spatial logic” (2005, p. 26). But Rift scholars have had nearly
nothing to say about how to translate environmental historiography’s insights into
broader explanatory models. Perhaps more surprisingly, they have evinced little interest
in theorizing historical change, content to assert the primacy of capitalism. Thus we are
left with a “theory of metabolic rift” that contains very little theorization. Beyond a
soil/resource exhaustion thesis and a general notion that capitalism does bad things to
nature, Rift thinking elaborates few working propositions on how capital, power, and
nature operate historically. Lacking theory, we are treated to a series of axioms that
substitute for theory-construction.
I state the matter so bluntly because I think Rift analysis has, in recent years, blunted
and discouraged the development of a relational theory of capitalism-in-nature. There is
a historical tendency at work that involves soil fertility. In successive eras of agricul-
tural development, yield growth reaches a ceiling beyond which new gains are increas-
ingly modest. This threatens to undermine labor productivity and increase reproduction
costs for labor-power. This is a cyclical phenomenon of the capitalist world-ecology, as
dominant agricultural models emerge, develop, and enter into crisis (Moore 2010c).
17 American agriculture between 1860 and 1930, for example, saw no meaningful change in land productivity,
but a galloping pace of rising labor productivity—notwithstanding an important tendency towards soil
exhaustion (Kloppenburg 1988; Cunfer 2004).
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These models are famously narrated in the history of the Dutch, English, American, and
“Green” agricultural revolutions,18 but they also comprise successive organizations of
botanical imperialism and cash-crop regimes across the periphery (Brockway 1978;
Schiebinger and Swan 2005; Galloway 1989). The decisive lesson of these agricultural
revolutions is that every spatial re-centering of agro-ecological production—each with
specific, commodity-inflected geographies—entails a qualitative restructuring of the
totality of agrarian relations: class structure, the range of necessary inputs, transporta-
tion infrastructure, the organization of money and credit, techniques of cultivation. The
highly capitalized family farm in late nineteenth-century Iowa bore little resemblance to
the landlord-tenant relations that dominated the English countryside at the end of the
seventeenth century. To be sure, soil fertility is a key moment in the story. By itself,
however, it tells us little directly about how agricultural revolutions run out of steam, or
how new agricultural revolutions take root and take flight. Soil fertility is a necessary
condition, but pedology itself is insufficient to shoulder either the theoretical and
historical burden assigned to it by Rift analysts.
While the “declining soil fertility leads to ecological imperialism” model has some
teeth for the English case, it does not work well for either the Dutch agricultural
revolution before it or the American agricultural revolutions after it. Each “hegemonic”
agro-ecological regime must find a way to deal with the productivity problem—but that
productivity problem assumes new forms in each era. These agro-ecological fixes are
instances of humans “mixing [their] labor with the earth,” (Williams 1980, p. 83), and
inexplicable either in terms of institutional renovation, class restructuring, or landscape
change as such. (An adequate explanation will focus on how these moments of class,
organization, and land fit together.) The British in the long nineteenth century dealt
with stagnant agricultural productivity growth—in motion from the 1760s—in part
through a phosphate-acquisition strategy, but in the main by outsourcing food produc-
tion to the Americans, whose agro-industrial revolution gathered steamed after 1840
(Moore 2015b). But the American agro-industrial revolution, as world-ecological fix,19
cannot be chalked up to differential fertility as such. It took shape through a series of
mutually reinforcing shifts: in the sociology of cultivation (the capitalized family farm
model) (Friedmann 1978); the early Republic’s consolidation of a spatial regime that
allowed for territorial expansion and a far-reaching rationalization of continental space
(Parenti 2015); a canal-railroad revolution (Taylor 1951); the development of financial
and futures markets that allowed for, say, Illinois wheat to be turned into abstract grain,
and which enabled foreign, mainly English, investors to hold a quarter of American rail
bonds by mid-century (Cronon 1991, ch. 3; Sobel 1965, p. 57). This is not an
exhaustive list. The point is to show that “soil” and the organizational apparatus of
“capital” and “state” were moments of a singular metabolism.
Second, the Rift’s conflation of “periphery” and “countryside” obscures capitalism’s
profound agro-ecological variability and unevenness. Countrysides may be relatively
rich or poor: contrast Iowa with Chiapas. These varied fixes took different forms in
successive eras. For the sixteenth-century Dutch, it was a neo-colonial market relation
18 Useful points of entry for these revolutions include, respectively, Hoppenbrouwers, and van Zanden (2001),
Overton (1996); Post (2011), Walker (2004); Patel (2013).
19 The language of world-ecological fix is a socio-ecological elaboration of Harvey’s theory (1982a),
extending his focus on built environments and investment flows to the town-country relation on a world-
scale (Moore 2015a).
306 Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318
with Polish seigneurs and enserfed labor. For the nineteenth-century English, it was in
part the guano trade and cognate processes elsewhere, but in the main another, more
politically-mediated, market fix through of American agro-industrialization. For the
Americans, the slowdown of labor productivity after 1900 was resolved through
geographical re-centering (the rise of California agriculture), and the hybridization
and the chemical-fertilization revolution after 1935.20 Peripheral spaces may or may
not be agrarian; agrarian spaces may or may not be peripheral.
Third, while Rift analysts rightly note the importance of “marking specific changes
within a mode of production” (York and Clark 2010a, b, p. 210), the reordering of
labor, energy, environment, and so forth is asserted axiomatically, rather than construct-
ed historically. In short, a stadial conception of capitalism is embraced discursively, but
with little sense in which the feedback of agro-ecological and extractive restructuring in
core and periphery shapes power and production in capitalism as a whole. Regional
shifts are described—sometimes with rich empirical detail—but it is difficult to see
how regional change co-produces global change. This is the danger of the Rift’s uni-
directional “footprint” approach. It obscures how modernity’s relations are reproduced
in law like but quasi-contingent form across geographical scales and regions, and it
underestimates the resistances of human and extra-human natures (e.g., weeds, dis-
eases, invasive species, biological exchanges, peasant revolts, etc.).
My sense is that the Rift argument has been given a pass by critical scholars because
the perspective has delivered a real service: emphasizing the importance of environ-
mental factors in the history of capitalism. It is now time to take up a new task: one in
which we can transcend the abstract determinism of core determining periphery, capital
determining nature (except in the ultimate “catastrophe”), and society determining
space. All these themes make sense only if one ignores the central insight of four
decades of critical human geography: namely, that all transformations of social relations
are transformations of spatial relations (Lefebvre 1991; Harvey 1982a; Moore 2015a).
In this perspective, capitalism not only occupies, but produces, space.21 A quarter-
century of robust research in political ecology demonstrates manifold instances of how
these socio-spatial relations are also moments of co-production (Heynen et al. 2007;
Peluso and Watts 2001; Peet et al. 2011). Capitalism not only occupies, but produces
and is produced by, the web of life. Unfortunately, such insights have been excluded
from Foster’s canon of green Marxism (e.g., Foster 2016a). Such lacunae may owe
something TO disciplinary insularity, but clearly disciplinary boundaries provide only a
partial explanation. Global sociologists, for example, have critically engaged and
elaborated Harvey’s theory of spatial fix (1982). Consider, for example, Arrighi’s
influential thesis that every phase of capitalism must revolutionize its spatial relations
of production, power, and accumulation (1994). Space is not a container within which
social relations unfold. Neither is the web of life (Moore 2015a).
20 See, respectively, Moore 2010b; Thomas 1993; Kloppenburg 1988; Walker 2004.
21 “Before producing effects in the material realm (tools and objects), before producing itself by drawing
nourishment from that realm, and before reproducing itself by generating other bodies, each living body is
space and has its space: it produces itself in space and it also produces that space. This is a truly remarkable
relationship: the body with the energies at its disposal, the living body, creates or produces its own space;
conversely, the laws of space, which is to say the laws of discrimination in space, also govern the living body
and the deployment of its energies” (Lefebvre 1991, p. 170).
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In the rush to separate “ecological” from other forms of imperialism, Rift scholars
have taken their eyes off the ball. Their catch-all category of ecological imperialism has
distracted them from the most exciting possibilities of their historical analysis. These
possibilities imply a rethinking of imperialism as an irreducibly socio-ecological
process. “The trick,” I wrote to Clark and Foster in 2002,
is to incorporate ecological transformations into the theory of capitalist develop-
ment and crisis (including imperialism) rather than to formulate ecological or
“green” theories of crisis, imperialism, and so forth. [Capitalism’s transforma-
tions] are (broadly speaking) ecological and not ecological at the same time. We
need socio-ecological theories of these latter rather than social and ecological
[theories]… The ecology question is the labor question is the agrarian question. If
these “questions” were once somewhat distinct (although we know now know
that they are much more closely articulated than we previously assumed) today
capitalism has brought these questions/crises together [as never before].22
In such an approach, the particularities of Rift analysis might be reconceptualized.
Imperialism, in its successive historical and geographical forms, could be reworked to
highlight the strategic relations of world power and global inequality, incorporating
organic and inorganic natures (humans included), symbolic praxis, and value. 23
Imperialism, in other words, would orient us towards the dynamic restructuring
power, capital, and nature: imperialism as a tightly woven bundle of land/labor
relations in service to metropolitan accumulation.
Dialectics/nature/method: whither the “great loosener”?
I have dwelt upon the conflation of the global metabolic rift and ecological imperialism
for a specific reason: to underscore the disjuncture between the Rift’s dialectical claims
and its dualist practicality. To be sure, the translation of dialectics into world-historical
method has been fraught. My point is not to insist on one “correct” method, but to
sketch the outlines of a productive conversation around a world-historical method that
grasps the messy and porous interpenetration of human and extra-human natures. At a
minimum, such a method implies the successive reordering of a perspective’s concep-
tual frames in light of empirical investigation—such that the incorporation of new
empirical phenomena allows for conceptual reflexivity. A perspective that emerges
with one conception of capitalism and nature and finds itself with the same conception
a decade or two later is unlikely to be practicing a dialectical method.24 Not for nothing
does Bhaskar describe dialectics as the “great loosener” of established binaries (2008,
p. 354).
Where is the “great loosener” in Rift categories of nature, disruption, alienation,
separation, society, capitalism, and crisis? This is difficult to see. The crucial dialectical
22 Personal communication, J.W. Moore to J.B. Foster and B. Clark, November 27, 2002.
23 See Frame (2016) for a suggestive analysis along these lines.
24 This is a dialectical inflection of Lakatos’s oft-quoted observation: “A research programme… is stagnating
if its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth” (1978, p. 112).
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procedure of sorting out the relation between the concept of a relation and the relation
itself—between signifier and signified—is conspicuously absent in most Rift analyses.
Nature, in particular, is taken as the object from which empirical facts can be wrested
rather unproblematically and in which the work of “natural scientists” is unduly
insulated from conceptual critique.25
Even when Clark and Foster speak of the “interpenetration of nature and society”
(2010, p. 126, 2013, p. 69), it is hard to see that claim at work. Dialectical interpen-
etration is messy and disruptive—even the luminaries of the dialectical method find it
difficult to put into practice (e.g., Ollman 2003). Rift arguments celebrate interpene-
tration and yet practically embrace the inviolability of Nature/Society as basic unit.
Nature relates to society, to be sure, but is independent of it (Clark and Foster 2012, p.
68). Society, too, relates to Nature, but as basic unit rather than dialectical moment:
“[H]umans have the potential to alter the conditions of life in ways that surpass natural
limits and undermine the reproduction of natural systems” (Clark and Foster 2010, p.
126).
Nearly two decades after Foster’s initial formulations, one can scarcely detect any
reconceptualization of Nature/Society or of the relations between the two. Indeed, quite
the contrary! Foster has doubled down on his methodological dualism, at once
proclaiming the usefulness of general abstraction and denying that Rift arguments are
dualist. Foster rightly notes that one may employ “conceptions that at first sight—when
separated out from the overall dynamics—may appear one-sided, mechanical, dualistic,
or reductionist” (2013, p. 9). Such conceptions isolate crucial “mediating relations” en
route to comprehending “the larger concrete totality” of capitalism.
No one is arguing this point. The problem with Foster’s clarification is that it begs
the question:What is the procedure of abstraction that governs the conceptualization of
mediating relations? There is no more fundamental a question in Marxist method,
given its view of capital and class as ontological conditions of capitalist development.
Consider the (absurd) thought-experiment of a Marxist conception of the state or mode
or production abstracted from capital and class. If Foster’s argument for metabolism as
immanent to class and capital holds—as I think it does—the metabolic moment of class
and capital cannot be abstracted. Metabolism operates simultaneously as outer and
inner moment of capital accumulation.
Significantly, Foster follows his defense of one-sided determinations—abstracted
from metabolism—by banishing biospheric nature to an “outer set of conditions or
boundary” (ibid.). That’s a telling defense, for two reasons. First, to be sure, the web of
life is an absolute limit in some highly abstract sense. That tells us what but not how.
Historical explanation turns on how capitalism’s thick processes (its “mediating rela-
tions”)—racialization and patriarchies, imperialism and industrialization, class strug-
gles and geopolitics—are irreducibly socio-ecological. Try making sense of class, race,
and gender—and the diversity of forms, historically and spatially—abstracted from the
25 “Facts in science do not present themselves in a preexistent shape. Rather it is the experimental or
observational protocol that constructs facts out of an undifferentiated nature. And if we do not like what we
see, we can rearrange the description of nature to have a more pleasing aspect. So facts make a theory, but it
takes a theory to make facts” (Lewontin 1991, p. 147, emphasis added). The celebration of “natural science”
and “natural scientists” runs throughout the arguments of Foster and his colleagues and is often paired with the
characterization of “social science” as comparatively uncritical and “quiescent” (see especially Foster et al.
2010, pp. 19–24).
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eco-geographical relations within which they unfold and that they in turn re/produce.
Second, the defense of dualism as a means to, eventually, recombining the elements is
reasonable—but only a for a time. Today, for the Rift, the bloom is off the rose. At
some point, a new synthesis must take shape.
Foster, Marx, and metabolism: a relational alternative
For environmental scholars and activists, the great worry is that a relational ontology of
humans in the web of life erases the question of nature and materiality. This worry has
motivated Foster’s defense of dualist practicality. Against this, we can balance a second
concern: namely that the defense of dualism reinforces variants of “wilderness funda-
mentalism” and “labor fundamentalism.” That Red and Green divide has significant
political implications that go well beyond debates over historical method. One-sided
determinations can work, but only within a dialectical trajectory committed to synthe-
sis. Thus, Foster’s defense of one-sided abstractions serves equally well as critique. As
Walker puts it,
Environmentalists may object that in this solution nature seems to disappear into
labor. But that’s not the case. Natural systems and processes continue to dominate
in a universe in which human beings are a very small part. Within the limited
domain of economic production, however, things are reversed. Human beings are
necessarily the initiating partners who put natural materials and forces to work in
a pre-determined manner; this is why Marx continued to assert that labor was the
active force in production. It is neither dualistic thinking nor runaway humanism
to say that there is a dominant element in the combination of labor-nature
relations, even though labor cannot function without its natural partner and labor
does not have absolute command over natural forces (whatever humans may
imagine!) 2017, 57.
I would take the argument one step further. Dialectically speaking, one-sided
determinations have a shelf life. The power of dialectical method is to show how a
one-sided contradiction creates, historically, the conditions of its transcendence.
Alongside Walker’s geographical frame—that while the web of life dominates, in
“economic production things are reversed”—I would add a historical argument.
The history of capitalism generates a tendency that undermines the bourgeoisie’s
capacity to accumulate through labor-in-nature. In “economic production,” things
are reversed only so long as frontiers of uncapitalized nature exist. These offset
entropic tendencies and enable the bourgeoisie’s “domination” in production. Over
time, however, a counter-tendency undoes the bourgeoisie’s “one-sided” determi-
nation. This is the activation of negative-value, understood as the evolution and
emergence of forms of nature—including the new ontological politics of food and
climate justice—that cannot be “fixed” through capitalism’s productivist logic.
Climate change, new diseases, and superweeds are important instances of nega-
tive-value’s activations (Moore 2015b; Wallace 2016). Far from denying limits—
as Foster has argued (2017)—such an approach clarifies how such limits are
formed through capitalism’s specific configurations in the web of life.
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To be sure, the optic of a “singular metabolism” appears starkly different from Rift
arguments today. I nevertheless think there is some common ground. Foster’s early
formulations may be fruitfully recast through Marx’s philosophy of internal relations
(McMichael 1990; Hopkins 1982; Moore 2015a; Ollman 2003). The metabolic rift may
be reconceptualized through capitalism’s longue durée reconfigurations of human and
extra-human natures (Moore 2000a). These reconfigurations are simultaneously—and
in asymmetrically variant fashion—propelled by the web of life. In such a method,
systemic determinism and regional particularism are ruled out; “systemic” changes
occur in overlapping planetary, systemic, regional, and bodily registers. Historically-
and geographically-specific metabolic flows and configurations not only express—they
co-produce—world-historical cycles and trends. The metabolic rift is, then, historically
constructed through distinct and manifold forms of environment-making—by human
and extra-human natures cohered in particular civilizations and their rules of reproduc-
tion. These latter are understood as “mutually-conditioning moments of a singular
phenomenon,” whose decisive features emerge out of successive part-whole move-
ments (McMichael 1990, p. 391; also Kosík 1976). Dialectical constructions progres-
sively erode whatever dualisms initially frame the analysis: hence Bhaskar’s “great
loosener.” To grasp nature dialectically—as field and relation as well as object—is to
move beyond chaotic conceptions and to unsettle our prevailing concepts of capitalism
and its constitutive relations.
Foster’s argument in Marx’s Ecology may be re-read in this light. It allows us to see
how metabolism could be integrated—was already integrated—into Marx’s system of
thought. In this respect,Marx’s Ecologymakes two enduring contributions. First, Foster
gives us a picture of Marx’s thinking about capitalism that transcends the Cartesian
divide. Marx’s Ecology is caught in a productive contradiction: between Marx’s
relational perspective on capital, class, and metabolism as internal relations and the
consequentialist bias that sees nature as external object. Although Foster structures the
narrative in arithmetic terms—“combin[ing] a materialist conception of history with a
materialist conception of nature”—the argument leans heavily towards monist synthe-
sis (singular metabolism) rather than dualist practicality (metabolism of nature and
society) (Foster 2000a, p. 8).
A second contribution turns on Foster’s handling of totality. Marx’s Ecology argues
that social totalities abstracted from nature are irremediably partial. Thus he criticizes
the Frankfurt School for ignoring the “the real, material alienation of nature” under
capitalism (2000a, p. 245).26 Together, these contributions opened the possibility for
unifying seemingly discrete elements of Marx’s thought—and along with it, the
seemingly discrete moments of “society” and “nature.” The discovery of metabolism,
Foster argues, allowed Marx—and by extension, could allow critical scholars today—
to “tie together his critique of the three principal emphases of bourgeois political
economy: the analysis of the extraction of surplus product from the direct producer
[surplus value]; the related theory of capitalist ground rent; and the Malthusian theory
of population” (2000a, p. 141). Rent, value, and socio-ecological reproduction: Foster
26 But did not Foster invert the problem (2013)—recuperating material nature and refusing symbolic nature—
in refusing the Frankfurt School’s accounting of symbolic natures, not least the latter’s elaboration of
instrumental reason?
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seems to be urging us to unify these dialectically, so that each moment constitutes, and
is revealed through, the other, and the whole.
This reading Marx’s Ecology has led me to conclusions that are very different from
today’s Rift perspective. These conclusions, taking shape through the world-ecology
conversation, outline an alternative to metabolic rift as rupture and interruption. They
are largely consonant with Foster’s powerful emphasis on alienation, which is above all
a constitutive and unifying relation rather than force of separation. In emphasizing shift
rather than rift, I am suggesting that the most interesting questions—analytical, but also
political—turn on the configurations of human and extra-human nature, and in how
these are irreducibly socio-ecological and symbolic at the same time. This line of
thought yields a co-productive ontology of metabolism, one fully consonant with
locating “the human relation to nature as one that encompasse[s] both ‘nature-imposed
conditions’ and the capacity of human beings to affect this process” (Foster 2000a, p.
158). Here Foster proposed a decisive break with human exemptionalism: the “mate-
rialist conception of nature [could become] fully integrated with [the] materialist
conception of history” (2000a, p. 141).
The synthesis had been signaled previously (Williams 1980; Smith 1984; Harvey
1995). But in the early 2000s, Foster’s world-historical sensibility (1994) promised to
turn over a new leaf in the long-running tension between so-called constructionist and
materialist perspectives. It seemed to call for a world-historical refoundation of envi-
ronmentalist thought, allowing for a far-ranging reconstruction of how we narrate,
analyze, and investigate historical capitalism. This new synthesis would comprise not
only a revitalized and reworked historical materialism in line with Marx’s system of
thought. It would also actively pursue the renewal of value-relational thinking—the law
of value as co-produced by humans and the rest of nature—offered by Burkett’s
pioneeringMarx and Nature (1999), which Foster encourages us to think of as a compan-
ion to Marx’s Ecology (2000a, p. 282n). The potential for synthesis was tantalizing. The
incorporation of an ecologically-informed theory of value into historical materialism—
the synthesis made possible by reading Marx’s Ecology and Marx and Nature as a
singular argument—would be a “groundbreaking” contribution whose importance “lies
precisely in the fact that it traces capitalism’s fundamental contradiction to the alien-
ation of nature and the alienation of human production, as two sides of a single
contradiction” (Foster 2000b, emphasis added). This would allow us to see the history
of capitalism as a world history in which nature matters not merely as consequence, but
as constitutive and active in the accumulation of abstract social labor.
Towards a singular metabolism
A singular metabolism underscores not society’s subsumption of nature (Foster 2016)
but its opposite: the limited capacities of human organizations to control and
dominate nature (Moore 2015a). Indeed, Foster and I agree on the key point:
human organizations unfold with a biosphere that shapes human sociality and is
shaped by it. There are crucial differences in method of abstraction and historical
method, with meaningful differences in the interpretation of the present crisis. These
cannot be reduced—and meaningful conversation cannot be realized—by reducing
these differences to inferred political position, that is reduced to the friends and enemies
of Marxism and socialism (e.g., Foster 2016a).
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Foster’s original formulation of metabolic rift highlighted the irreducibly geograph-
ical character of human activity. It gave us a way to understand the geography of
capitalism as an “ontological condition” (Pred 2006). Marx and Engels’s argument
about the urbanization of the countryside—a process unfolding through successive
historical determinations—underscored how capitalism’s relations of production, class,
and accumulation enter into specific geographical forms, from their sixteenth century
origins to the advent of large-scale industry (1970; Marx 1973, 1977: Part 8). These
historical-geographical crystallizations do not produce a social metabolism that subse-
quently confronts a natural metabolism; they are co-produced through a singular
metabolism in which humans—and human organizations—participate. Metabolisms
are always geographical. Capitalist relations move through, not upon, space, which is to
say through, and not upon, nature as a whole.
Put in these terms, the apparent solidity of town and country, bourgeois and
proletarian, and above all Society and Nature, begins to melt. Metabolism, liberated
from dualisms, acts as a solvent. For if metabolism is invoked as a way to think about
nature as a totality of totalities in which life and matter enter into specific historical-
geographical arrangements, an important task comes before us. We are called to
construct much more supple and historically-sensitive families of concepts, unified
by a dialectical method that transcends all manner of dualisms—not least, but not only,
Nature/Society.
Acknowledgements Special thanks to Henry Bernstein, Phil Campanile, Jennifer Casolo, Sharae Deckard,
Phil McMichael, Mike Niblett, Christian Parenti, Raj Patel, Alan Rudy, Dale Tomich, Richard Walker, and
Anna Zalik for conversations on metabolism and dialectics. I am especially grateful to Diana C. Gildea and my
students at Binghamton University (and elsewhere) for ongoing conversations about the “singular metabo-
lism” of the capitalist world-ecology: Jay Bolthouse, Alvin A. Camba, Joshua Eichen, Benjamin Marley,
Roberto José Ortiz, Andy Pragacz, Kyle Gibson, and Christopher Cox.
References
Abulafia, D. (2008). The Discovery of Mankind. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Altvater, E. (2016). The Capitalocene, or, Geoengineering against Capitalism’s Planetary Boundaries. In J. W.
Moore (Ed.), Anthropocene or Capitalocene? (pp. 138–152). Oakland: PM Press.
Araghi, F., and P. McMichael. (2017). Contextualizing (Post)modernity. Review: A Journal of the Fernand
Braudel Center.
Arnold, D. (1996). The Problem of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell.
Arrighi, G. (1994). The Long Twentieth Century. London: Verso.
Bennett, J. (2009). Vibrant Matter. Durham: Duke Univ. Press.
Bhaskar, R. (2008). Dialectic. New York: Routledge.
Birch, C., & Cobb, J. B. (1981). The Liberation of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bleichmar, D., De Vos, P., Huffine, K., & Sheehan K. (Eds.). (2009). Science in the Spanish and Portuguese
Empires, 1500–1800. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bolthouse, J. (2014). Rethinking Capital’s Relations to Nature. Japanese Journal of Human Geography,
66(6), 580–594.
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Braudel, F. (1953). Qu’est-ce que le XVIe siècle? Annales E.S.C., 8(1), 69–73.
Braudel, F. (1982). The Wheels of Commerce. New York: Harper & Row.
Braudel, F. (2009). History and the Social Sciences. Review, 32(3), 171–203.
Braun, B. and N. Castree, eds. (1998). Remaking Reality. New York: Routledge.
Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318 313
Brenner, R. (1976). Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe. Past &
Present, 70, 30–75.
Brenner, N. (Ed.). (2013). Implosions/Explosions. Berlin: Jovis.
Brockway, L. H. (1978). Science and Colonial Expansion. New York: Academic Press.
Bruce, B., & Castree, N. (Eds.). (1998). Remaking Reality. New York: Routledge.
Bunker, S. G., & Ciccantell, P. S. (2005).Globalization and the Race for Resources. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Burkett, P. (1999). Marx and Nature. New York: St. Martin’s.
Burkett, P., & Foster, J. B. (2016). Marx and the Earth. Leiden: Brill.
Camba, A. A. (2015). From Colonialism to Neoliberalism. Extractive Industries and Society, 2, 287–301.
Campbell, C. (2016). Glancing backwards: George Lamming, John Cowper Powys and vexed visions of
labour in the capitalist world-ecology. Green Letters, 20(2), 170–182.
Cañizares-Esguerra, J. (2004). Iberian science in the renaissance. Perspectives on Science, 12(1), 86–124.
Clark, B., & Foster, J. B. (2004). Ecological Imperialism. In L. Panitch & C. Leys (Eds.), Socialist Register
2004 (pp. 186–201). London: Merlin Press.
Clark, B., & Foster, J. B. (2009). Ecological Imperialism and the Global Metabolic Rift. International Journal
of Comparative Sociology, 50(3–4), 311–334.
Clark, B., & Foster, J. B. (2010). The Dialectic of Social and Ecological Metabolism. Socialism and
Democracy, 24(2), 124–138.
Clark, B., & Foster, J. B. (2012). Guano. In A. Hornborg et al. (Eds.), Ecology and Power (pp. 68–82). New
York: Routledge.
Clark, B., & York, R. (2005). Carbon Metabolism. Theory and Society, 34(4), 391–428.
Clark, B. and R. York (2012). Techno-Fix. Pp. %-36 in A. Hornborg, Brett Clark, and Kenneth Hermele, eds.,
Ecology and Power. New York: Routledge.
Clausen, R., & Clark, B. (2005). The Metabolic Rift and Marine Ecology. Organization & Environment,
18(4), 422–444.
Cosgrove, D. (2008). Geography and Vision. London: I.B. Tauris.
Cox, C. R. (2015). The Problematic Nature of ‘the Anthropocene’. Telos, 172, 59–81.
Cronon, W. (1991). Nature’s Metropolis. New York: W.W. Norton.
Cronon, W. (1995). The Trouble with Wilderness, or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. Environmental
History, 1(1), 7–28.
Crosby, A. W. (1997). The Measure of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cunfer, G. (2004). Manure Matters on the Great Plains. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 34(4), 539–567.
Davis, M. (2001). Late Victorian Holocausts. London: Verso.
de Vries, J., & van der Woude, A. (1997). The First Modern Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Deckard, S. (2016). World-Ecology and Ireland: The Neoliberal Ecological Regime. Journal of World-Systems
Research, 22(1), 145–176.
Dixon, M. (2015). Biosecurity and the multiplication of crises in the Egyptian agri-food industry. Geoforum,
61, 90–100.
Duncan, C. A. M. (1996). The Centrality of Agriculture. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
Dunlap, R. E., & Catton Jr., W. R. (1979). Environmental Sociology. Annual Reviews in Sociology, 5, 243–
273.
El Khoury, A. (2015). Globalization, Development, and Social Justice. New York: Routledge.
Engel-Di Mauro, S. (2014). Ecology, Soils, and the Left. New York: Palgrave.
Federici, S. (2004). Caliban and the witch. New York: Autonomedia.
Fischer-Kowalski, M. (1997). Society’s Metabolism. In M. R. Redclift & G. Woodgate (Eds.), The
International Handbook of Environmental Sociology (pp. 119–137). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Fischer-Kowalski, M., & Haberl, H. (1998). Sustainable Development. International Social Science Journal,
158, 573–587.
Foster, J. B. (1992). The Absolute General Law of Environmental Degradation Under Capitalism. Capitalism
Nature Socialism, 3(2), 77–86.
Foster, J. B. (1993). The limits of environmentalism without class. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 4(1), 11–41.
Foster, J. B. (1994). The Vulnerable Planet. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Foster, J. B. (1999). Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift. American Journal of Sociology, 105(2), 366–405.
Foster, J. B. (2000a). Marx’s Ecology. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Foster, J.B. (2000b). Marx’s Ecological Value Analysis. Monthly Review, 52(4), online, http://monthlyreview.
org/2000/09/01/marxs-ecological-value-analysis.
Foster, J. B. (2009). The Ecological Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press.
314 Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318
Foster, J. (2013a). Marx and the Rift in the Universal Metabolism of Nature. Monthly Review 65/7, 2013, 1–
19.
Foster, J. B. (2013b). The Epochal Crisis, Monthly Review, 65(5), 1–17.
Foster, J. B. (2015). The Great Capitalist Climacteric. Monthly Review, 67(6), 1–18.
Foster, J.B. (2016a). In defense of ecological Marxism. http://climateandcapitalism.com/2016/06/06/in-
defense-of-ecological-marxism-john-bellamy-foster-responds-to-a-critic/, retrieved 4 June, 2016.
Foster, J.B. (2016b). Marxism in the Anthropocene. International Critical Thought, 6(3), 393–421.
Foster, J. B., & Clark, B. (2016). Marx’s Ecology and the Left. Monthly Review, 68(2), 1–25.
Foster, J. B., & Holleman, H. (2014). The theory of unequal ecological exchange. Journal of Peasant Studies,
41(2), 199–233.
Foster, J. B., & Magdoff, F. (1998). Liebig, Marx, and the depletion of soil fertility. Monthly Review, 50(3),
32–45.
Foster, J. B., Clark, B., & York, R. (2010). The Ecological Rift. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Frame, M. L. (2016). The Neoliberalization of (African) Nature as the Current Phase of Ecological
Imperialism. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 27(1), 87–105.
Friedmann, H. (1978). World Market, State, and Family Farm. Comparative Studies in Society and History,
20(4), 545–586.
Galeano, E. (1973). Opens Veins of Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Galloway, J. H. (1989). The Sugar Cane Industry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gill, B. (2016). Can the river speak? Environment and Planning A, 48(4), 699–717.
Goldman, M., & Schurman, R. A. (2000). Closing the ‘Great Divide. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), 563–
584.
Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. New York: Routledge.
Haraway, D. (2008). When Species Meet. Minnesota: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
Haraway, D. (2016). Staying with the Trouble. In J. W. Moore (Ed.), Anthropocene or Capitalocene? (pp. 34–
76). Oakland: PM Press.
Hartley, D. (2016). Anthropocene, Capitalocene and the problem of culture. In Anthropocene or
Capitalocene?, ed. J.W. Moore, 154–65. Oakland: PM Press.
Harvey, D. (1974). Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science. Economic Geography, 50(3), 256–
277.
Harvey, D. (1982). The Limits to Capital. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Harvey, D. (1993). The Nature of Environment. In R. Miliband & L. Panitch (Eds.), Socialist Register 1993
(pp. 1–51). London: Merlin.
Harvey, D. (1995). Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S., & Robbins P. (Eds.). (2007). Neoliberal Environments. New York:
Routledge.
Hopkins, T. K. (1982). World-systems analysis: Methodological issues. In T. K. Hopkins, I. Wallerstein, et al.
(Eds.), World-Systems Analysis (pp. 145–158). Beverly Hills: Sage.
Hoppenbrouwers, P., & van Zanden, J. L. (Eds.). (2001). Peasants into farmers? Turnhout: Brepols.
Hulme, P. (1994). Tales of Distinction. In S. B. Schwartz (Ed.), Implicit Understandings (pp. 157–197).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jakes, A. (2016). Booms, Bugs, and Busts: Ecologies of Interest on Egypt’s Commodity Frontier, 1882–1914.
Antipode.
James, P. (2015). They have never been modern? Arena Journal, 44, 31–54.
Kicza, J. E. (1992). Patterns in Early Spanish Overseas Expansion. William and Mary Quarterly, 49(2), 229–
253.
Kloppenburg, J. R. (1988). First the Seed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kosík, K. (1976). Dialectics of the Concrete. Boston: D. Reidel.
Kuklick, H. (1991) The savage within. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Lakatos, I. (1978). The methodology of scientific research programmes. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Latour, B. (1993) We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Leerssen, J. (1995). Wildness, Wilderness, and Ireland. Journal of the History of Ideas, 56(1), 25–39.
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell.
Levins, R., & Lewontin, R. (1985). The Dialectical Biologist. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lewontin, R. C. (1991). Facts and the Factitious in Natural Sciences. Critical Inquiry, 18(1), 140–153.
Longo, S. B. (2012). Mediterranean rift. Critical Sociology, 38(3), 417–436.
Longo, S. B., & Clark, B. (2012). The Commodification of Bluefin Tuna. Journal of Agrarian Change, 12(2–
3), 204–226.
Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318 315
Lukács, G. (1971). History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Malm, A. (2016). Fossil Capital. London: Verso.
Mancus, P. (2007). Nitrogen Fertilizer Dependency and Its Contradictions. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 269–288.
Marley, B. J. (2016). The Coal Crisis in Appalachia. Journal of Agrarian Change, 16(2), 225–254.
Marx, K. (1959). Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Marx, K. (1967). Capital. 3 vols. New York: International Publishers.
Marx, K. (1973). Grundrisse. New York: Vintage.
Marx, K. (1977). Capital, Vol. I. New York: Vintage.
Marx, K. (1981). Capital, Vol. III. New York: Penguin.
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1970). The German Ideology. New York: International Publishers.
McBrien, J. (2016). Accumulating Extinction. In J. W. Moore (Ed.), Anthropocene or Capitalocene?
(pp. 116–137). Oakland: PM Press.
McMichael, P. (1990). Incorporating Comparison Within a World-Historical Perspective. American
Sociological Review, 55(2), 385–97.
Meillassoux, C. (1981). Maidens, meal and money. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellilo, E. D. (2015). Strangers on Familiar Soil. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Merchant, C. (1980). The Death of Nature. New York: Harper & Row.
Merchant, C. (1989). Ecological Revolutions. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Mills, C. W. (1959). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Modest, W. (2012). We have always been modern. Museum Anthropology, 35(1), 85–96.
Moore, J. W. (2000a). Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical Perspective.
Organization & Environment, 13(2), 123–157.
Moore, J. W. (2000b). Sugar and the Expansion of the Early Modern World-Economy. Review, 23(3), 409–
433.
Moore, J. W. (2003a). The Modern World-System as Environmental History? Theory & Society, 32(3), 307–
377.
Moore, J. W. (2003b). Nature and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism. Review, 26(2), 97–172.
Moore, J. W. (2003c). Capitalism as World-Ecology. Organization & Environment, 16(4), 431–458.
Moore, J. W. (2007). Ecology and the Rise of Capitalism. PhD dissertation, Department of Geography,
University of California, Berkeley.
Moore, J. W. (2009). Madeira, Sugar, & the Conquest of Nature in the ‘First’ Sixteenth Century, Part I. Review,
32(4), 345–390.
Moore, J. W. (2010a). ‘Amsterdam is Standing on Norway’ Part I. Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(1), 35–71.
Moore, J. W. (2010b). ‘Amsterdam is Standing on Norway’ Part II. Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(2), 188–
227.
Moore, J. W. (2010c). The End of the Road? Agricultural Revolutions in the Capitalist World-Ecology, 1450-
2010. Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(3), 389–413.
Moore, J. W. (2010d). Madeira, Sugar, & the Conquest of Nature in the ‘First’ Sixteenth Century, Part II.
Review, 33(1), 1–24.
Moore, J. W. (2010e). This Lofty Mountain of Silver Could Conquer the Whole World. Journal of
Philosophical Economics, 4(1), 58–103.
Moore, J. W. (2011a). Transcending the Metabolic Rift. Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(1), 1–46.
Moore, J. W. (2011b). Ecology, Capital, and the Nature of Our Times. Journal of World-Systems Analysis,
17(1), 108–147.
Moore, J. W. (2014). The End of Cheap Nature, or: How I learned to Stop Worrying about ‘the’
Environment and Love the Crisis of Capitalism. In C. Suter & C. Chasde-Dunn (Eds.), Structures
of the World Political Economy and the Future of Global Conflict and Cooperation (pp. 285–314).
Berlin: LIT.
Moore, J. W. (2015a). Capitalism in the Web of Life. London: Verso.
Moore, J. W. (2015b). Cheap Food and Bad Climate. Critical Historical Studies, 2(1), 1–43.
Moore, J. W. (2016a). Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism. Oakland:
PM Press.
Moore, J. W. (2016b). The Rise of Cheap Nature. In J. W. Moore (Ed.), Anthropocene or Capitalocene? (pp.
78–115). Oakland: PM Press.
Moore, J. W. (2017a). The Capitalocene, Part I: On the nature and origins of our ecological crisis.Journal of
Peasant Studies, 44(3), 594–630.
Moore, J.W. (2017b). The Capitalocene, Part II. Journal of Peasant Studies.
Mumford, L. (1934). Technics & Civilization. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Murray, P. (1988). Marx’s Theory of Scientific Knowledge. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
316 Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318
Nader, H. (2002). Desperate men, questionable acts. Sixteenth Century Journal, 33(2), 401–422.
Niblett, M., & Campbell, C. (Eds.). (2016). The Caribbean. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Ohlmeyer, J. (2016). Conquest, Civilization, Colonization. In R. Bourke & I. McBride (Eds.), The Princeton
History of Modern Ireland (pp. 21–47). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ollman, B. (2003). Dance of the Dialectic. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Oloff, K. (2016). Zombies, Gender and World-Ecology. In M. Niblett & C. Campbell (Eds.), The Caribbean.
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Overton, M. (1996). Agricultural Revolution in England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oxford English Dictionary. (2016). Society. In The Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com, accessed 10
July 2016.
Parenti, C. (2015). The Environment-Making State. Antipode, 47(4), 829–848.
Patel, P. (2013). The Long Green Revolution. Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(1), 1–63.
Patel, R., and Moore, J. (2017). A History of the World in Seven Cheap Things. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Patterson, O. (1982). Slavery and Social Death. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
Peluso, N., & Watts, M. (Eds.). (2001). Violent Environments. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Peet, R., P. Robbins, and M. Watts, eds. (2011). Global Political Ecology. New York: Routledge.
Plumwood, V. (1993). Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. New York: Routledge.
Poly, J., & Bournazel, E. (1997). The Feudal Transformation, 900–1(200). New York: Holmes &
Meier.
Pomeranz, K. (2000). The Great Divergence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Post, C. (2011). The American Road to Capitalism. Leiden: Brill.
Pred, A. (2006). No title, faculty biography page, http://geog.berkeley.edu/PeopleHistory/faculty/A_Pred.
html, accessed 23 April 2015.
Rai, M. (1993). Columbus in Ireland. Race & Class, 34(4), 25–34.
Raworth, K. (2014). Must the Anthropocene be a Manthropocene? The Guardian (October 20).
Sayer, D. (1987). The Violence of Abstraction. Oxford: Blackwell.
Schiebinger, L. L., & Swan, C. (Eds.). (2005). Colonial Botany. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Schneider, M., & McMichael, P. (2010). Deepening, and Repairing, the Metabolic Rift. Journal of Peasant
Studies, 37(3), 461–484.
Smith, N. (1984). Uneven Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Sobel, R. (1965). The Big Board. New York: Free Press.
Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978). Intellectual and Manual Labour. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
Stavig, W. (2000). Ambiguous Visions. Hispanic American Historical Review, 80(1), 77–111.
Sued-Badillo, J. (1992). Christopher Columbus and the enslavement of the Amerindians in the Caribbean.
Monthly Review, 44(3), 71–103.
Taylor, G. R. (1951). The transportation revolution, 1815–1860. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Taylor, P. J. (1999). Modernities. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Taylor, M. (2015). The Political Ecology of Climate Change Adaptation. New York: Routledge.
Thomas, B. (1993). The Industrial Revolution and the Atlantic Economy. New York: Routledge.
Thompson, F. M. L. (1966). The social distribution of landed property in England since the sixteenth century.
Economic History Review, 19(3), 505–517.
Tilly, C. (1984). Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons. New York: Russell Sage.
Tomich, D. (2004). Through the Prism of Slavery. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Toscano, A. (2016). The World Is Already without Us. Social Text, 34(2), 109–124.
von Werlhof, C. (1988). On the concept of nature and society in capitalism. In M. Mies et al. (Eds.), Women:
The Last Colony (pp. 96–112). London: Zed.
Wackernagel, M., & Rees, W. (1996). Our Ecological Footprint. Gabriola Island: New Society
Publishers.
Walker, R. A. (2004). The Conquest of Bread. New York: New Press.
Walker, R.A. (2017). Value and Nature. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 28(1), 53–61.
Wallace, R. (2016). Big Farms Make Big Flu. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World-System I. New York: Academic Press.
Warf, B., & Arias, S. (Eds.). (2008). The spatial turn. New York: Routledge.
Watts, M. J. (1983). Silent Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Watts, M. J. (2005). Nature: Culture. In P. Cloke & R. Johnston (Eds.), Spaces of Geographical
Thought (pp. 142–174). London: Sage.
Weis, T. (2013). The Ecological Hoofprint. London: Zed.
Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318 317
Williams, R. (1980). Problems in Culture and Materialism. London: Verso.
Williams, R. (1983). Keywords. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wood, A. (2007). The 1549 rebellions and the making of early modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Worster, D. (1990). Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History. Journal of
American History, 76(4), 1087–1106.
York, R. (2007). Demographic trends and energy consumption in European Union Nations, 1960–2025.
Social Science Research, 36(3), 855–872.
York, R. (2010). Metabolic Rift. In C.J. Cleveland, ed., Encyclopedia of the Earth, http://www.eoearth.
org/view/article/154577/, accessed 8 March, 2014.
York, R., & Clark, B. (2010a). Nothing New Under the Sun? Review, 33(2/3), 203–224.
York, R., & Clark, B. (2010b). Critical Materialism. Sociological Inquiry, 80(3), 475–499.
Young, R. M. (1979). Science is a Labor Process. Science for the People, 43-44, 31–37.
Jason W. Moore is a historical geographer and world historian at Binghamton University, where he is
Associate Professor of Sociology and Research Fellow at the Fernand Braudel Center. He is author of
Capitalism in the Web of Life (Verso 2015) and editor of Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History,
and the Crisis of Capitalism (PM Press 2016). He writes frequently on the history of capitalism, environmental
history, and social theory. His research has been recognized with the Distinguished Scholarship Award of the
Section on the Political Economy of the World-System, American Sociological Association (2002 and 2015);
the Alice Hamilton Prize in environmental history (2003); the Braverman Award in labor studies (1999); and
the Bernstein and Byres Prize in agrarian studies (2011). Moore’s latest book is A History of the World in
Seven Cheap Things (2017), with Raj Patel, and he is presently completing Ecology and the Rise of Capitalism
– both with the University of California Press. He is coordinator of the World-Ecology Research Network.
318 Theor Soc (2017) 46:285–318
